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Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
ISB # 7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP 
14 :3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho Limited) 






JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN ) 
CANNON, husband and wife; DAREN ) 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; ) 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN ) 
REAL TORS, a real estate company ) 
incorporated in Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-2012-2195 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S 
56(F) MOTION 
Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP, (Path) offers the following Response in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The response is supported by the pleadings and 
affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen submitted herewith. Moreover, there are four depositions that are 
or will be taken this week and next which is expected to provide additional testimony and 
evidence that support Path's claims and/or will at the very least create issues of material fact, 
making the award of summary judgment inappropriate and premature. 
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1, a s 
failures and misrepresentations, buyer Path and sellers Joseph and Meagan Cannon (Cannons) 
should have been informed and/or were mislead into believing that property being sold was 
appropriately zoned for commercial use, when it was not. Both Path and Cannons suffered losses 
and damages as a result of Mr. Long's failures. Path has set forth a number of claims (including 
assigned Cannons' claims) against the defendants, based on contract theories, tort including 
misrepresentation, and statutory duties. While ultimately some of these theories may be pared 
down as would be anticipated in any pre-trial process, the Defendants simply have not provided 
undisputed facts (or any facts at all in some cases) that warrant a ruling for summary judgment, 
particularly given the fact that this is a jury trial. Further, these claims and their underlying 
theories recognized in Idaho support a variety of damages, again to be proven at trial. 
SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. 
C1v. P. 56(c); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17 (Idaho 1991). It is 
well recognized that, when assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court must view all 
facts and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. G&lvf Farms v. Funk Irrigation 
Co., 119 Idaho at 517; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874 (Ct. App. 1994); 
Haessley v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463 (Idaho 1992). 
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Tingly v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89 (Idaho 1994 ). The non-moving party must establish a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the moving party's motion. 
Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 (Idaho 1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (Idaho 1988). Circumstantial evidence 
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create a material Anderson 1 l l 
1 1 ( 986). In circumstantial evidence be to 
and raise a genuine issue of material fact. Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 695 P.2d 413 (1985 
Ida. App.). Moreover, "if a party moving for summary judgment raises issues in his motion but 
tl -C' '1 + ' ;i ' l h ' 1 1 f ' ' f ' l " ' 1 11en 1ai1s LO prov1ue any ev1ucncc s 1owmg a 1aCK o any genume issue o matena ract v11L1 
respect to those issues, the non-moving party has no burden to respond with supporting 
evidence." Allstate Insurance Company v. Jacobson, 133 Idaho 593,990 P.2d 1204 (1999). See 
also, Shelton v. Shelton, 148 Idaho 560,225 P.3d 693 (2009). 
MATERIAL FACTS 
The Defendants' recitation of the alleged facts omits numerous other relevant facts and 
allegations that paint an entirely different picture than what is actually contained in the record. 
Moreover, the record in this case has been substantially supplemented this week and next week, 
with the depositions of five potential witnesses in the case, including that of the Defendant's key 
witness, Daren Long, as well as the original (and cun-ent) owner of the property, Rod Furniss. 
There are also subpoenas being issued to individuals who may shed further light on the case and 
also may be used for impeachment purposes. The testimony and information that has yet to come 
out in this case is fully expected to either corroborate Path's claims or at the very least generate 
material issues of fact that make a summary judgment ruling at this time premature. 
A summary of the key facts and allegations of this case are as follows: 
Path to Health is a health care provider of "holistic health" services. (Path's Amended 
Complaint ,i 7, Dee. 5. 2013 Dep. of Dave Carpenter pp. 9-27, 32-36.) Its principles in 2011 
were Dr. Dave Carpenter and his son Troy Carpenter. (Id. 36: 11-17.) In 2011 and before, Path 
to Health rented an office building in downtown Idaho Falls. (Id. pp. 32-36.) Another health care 
provider of "naturopathy," Dr. Karie Jonak, subleased space with Path at that location. (Id.) For 
various reasons, during the spring of 2001, Path and Dr. Jonak discussed finding another location 
to house their business. (Id.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3 
was tasked 
to Long to 
search for a suitable property for Path and Dr. Jonak's business. (Id. 40-42.) Mr. Long did not 
have Troy sign a "Sellers Representation Agreement" prior to showing him properties. 
IDc" 0 n,b"'r i:; '1Q 1 ".) n"P of Tro" l'c,rpPntPr pn 1 J-1 ') ) OvPr a "e"eral urep], perior1 Mr Lnng \ \,,.,V.l L V J' L., 'L./V • .L _1._.1, J ...___,U1. '-'J..,.l V.l' JtJ• -J ~._,. ....,-Ao.. u , _.._ .1. ,V ....,,..._ ,, _..__._ ...,.,, ..._.._. ·._,. ,._ 
showed Troy and Dr. Jonak numerous commercial properties. (Dave Carpenter Dep. 40, Troy 
Carpenter Dep. 36.) Troy sought assurance from Mr. Long that the property was properly zoned 
at least twice. (Id. 3 9: 15-19, 41: 14-16.) At no point did Mr. Long tell Troy to "check" with the 
City about the zoning. (Id. 39:9-17.) 
At some point during the process, Mr. Long showed Path a condominium unit located at 
480 W. Sunnyside Road# 4, in Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 ("Property") (Dave Carpenter Dep. 
4 7: 12-25, 48, 49.) This unit was one of four units at a building on the corner of Rollandet and 
Sunnyside. (Id.) Three of the units are residences. (Id.) The fourth unit shown had been 
converted into office space. (Id.) 
Path became interested in this property. Path negotiated the purchase of the property 
through Mr. Long to its ctment owners Meagan and Joseph Cannon. (Id.) (Cannons) (Meagan 
had no direct contact with any of the pmiies.) Throughout the entire process that Path 
investigated and visited the property, they discussed and received assurances from Mr. Long on 
numerous occasions confirming that the zoning was appropriate for its intended use. (Id. 44: 13-
25, 45:1-10, 49:3-12, 50:17-15, 51 :1, 89-92, 123:1-25 Ex. 5, Amended Complaint ,i 10.) 
Through Long, Path negotiated the purchase of the property which was closed on or about 
May 25, 2011. The purchase price was $120,000 seller financed, with a $10,000 down payment. 
Path's end of the closing occun-ed at the offices of First American Title Company. Mr. Long was 
present at the closing where again the Carpenters sought assurances about the zoning, was 
specifically told by Mr. Long that "there would be no problem at all." (Dave Carpenter Dep 90: 
20-25, 91:1-18.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 4 
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Path purchased the property, the company 
costs. (Amended Complaint 1120-23.) order to 
substantial 
to make move, 
to get the previous landlord to agree to terminate its lease early. (Troy Carpenter Dep. 25: 13-25, 
26.) The landlord was able to find a new tenant and would only agree to let Path out of the lease 
if Path would make the move in a relatively short period of time. (Id.) In essence, there was verJ 
little transition time from one location to the other. (Id.) In addition, Path incurred problems with 
the prope1iy that had to be addressed and fixed to get into working order. (Dave Carpenter Dep. 
60: 3-12 100: 21-25, 101, 102.) They had to fix the sink, the garage door, and most significantly 
deal with major problems with the telephone and communications wiring. (Id.) For some time, 
Path did not have telephone service. (Id.) Path also sent a massive mailing out to its customers 
informing them of the new location, incurring significant postage costs ( one of many other 
expenses of the move.) (Id. 58-60.) Path also made a number of improvements to the property, 
painting the entire building and cleaning the carpets. (Id. 101, 102, 129-131.) Path also finished 
the basement. (Id.) 
A few days after Path moved into the facility, Mr. Long stopped by the office to meet 
with Troy Carpenter. (Troy Carpenter Dep: 31: 15-25, 32, 33.) Mr. Long was in a hurry. He 
brought in some documents and said "I forgot to do some stuff, I'm in big trouble, can you help 
me out." (Id.) Mr. Long then handed the documents to Troy asking him to sign and back date the 
documents, which Troy did as a favor. (Id.) One of the documents was the "Seller 
Representation Agreement" and the other was the actual Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement (REPC). Mr. Long did not review the documents with Troy, other than to briefly say 
one was a representation agreement and that "he should have done it before we looked at 
properties." (Id. 32: 2-19.) Moreover, Mr. Long did not leave a copy of the documents with 
Troy. 
Sometime after moving into the property, Path approached the City ofldaho Falls (City) 
about obtaining a permit for signage on the prope1iy. (Amended Complaint 1 19.) At that time, 
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on 
use. Carpenter Dep. .) 
which was 
that time, 
issues that had occuned with the zoning on the property, primarily with Mr. Rod Furniss. 1 (Id.) 
The City informed Path that it needed to obtain a conditional use permit to continue to be 
able to operate its business at the property. (Id. pp. 97 -100) (Amended Complaint 120.) 
Obtaining that permit was by no means a guarantee, and required approval by both the City 
Planning and Zoning Council (P&Z) and the full City Council. (Id.) (See also Olsen Aff Ex. 4.) 
Path incuned a substantial amount of time and money in pursuing the conditional use permit. 
(Id.) At the P&Z hearing, council members expressed deep concerns about allowing a conditional 
use pennit when there had been "misrepresentations by the realtor" in the matter. (Olsen Aff. Ex. 
4.) Ultimately, the conditional use pennit was granted. However, there were numerous verbal 
representations made to Path by City P&Z staff that the City intended to "do away with all 
conditional use permits in the future." (Dave Carpenter Dep. 99:5-18, Ex. 5.) 
Even though Path had received the permit, and could at least operate on a temporary 
basis, Path was upset and concerned about how this would affect their future and the value of the 
building. (Id. 67, 68, 95: 17-25.) Path also received estimates that it would take $50,000 to 
$60,000 to convert the space to a residence. (Id. 102: 11-18, Ex. 21Amended Complaint~ 21.) In 
addition, the value of the Property is substantially reduced as a residence. (Id. 67-68.) 
At this point, Path begin to work on mitigating the harms that had been done. (See 
generally the pleadings.) Ultimately, Path filed a complaint against Cannons to rescind the 
contract and for damages. (Id.) In September of 2012, Path and Cannons mediated the issue -
wherein Path agreed to return title of the property to Cannons and Cannons agreed to assign any 
claims that they had against the Defendants to Path. (Id.) During the course of the finance 
agreement between Path and Cannons, Path paid over $9,000 to Cannons. (Amended Complaint) 
1 There are numerous relevant facts pertaining to ML Furniss both at the time he obtained the conditional 
use permit and when he sold and ultimately repurchased the property from Cannons. If necessary, this 
response will be supplemented with that information. There are also significant if not troubling issues with 
regard to Mr. Furniss's credibility that will be raised at trial. 
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paid $10,000 at time of closing toward purchase, was to the 
realtor commission. Path also over in foreclosure costs to cure 
the default and prevent foreclosure on the property.) (Id.) Path moved out of the property in the 
middle of October of 2012, again incurring significant moving costs in the process. (Id.) 
At the time of the mediation, Path learned Cannons' side of the story, and in particular 
Cannons' dealings with Mr. Long and the Defendants. (Id .109.) In approximately 2009, Cannons 
purchased the property from Mr. Furniss for $140,000, borrowing the money from Meagan 
Cannon's father. (December 13, 2013, Dep. of.Joseph Cannon 14-15, 41:17-23, 57:4-11.) 
Furniss did not advise Cannons of the zoning issues and the need to obtain a conditional use 
permit. (Id. 15: 18-25.) Additionally, Cannons did not pursue a conditional use permit for their 
commercial use of the property. (Id.) At that time, Joseph Cannon was considering whether to 
purchase Mr. Furniss's financial planning business. (Id. 14-16.) He decided to pursue other 
interests. (Id.) In so doing, Cannons decided to put the property up for sale. (Id.) Mr. Furniss 
recommended his good friend Daren Long to be Cannons' realtor. (Id. 22.) In December of 
2010, Joseph Cannon met with Mr. Long at Barnes & Noble book store to discuss the 
representation. (Id. 23:4-23, 24.) Mr. Long had Mr. Cannon "sign a document" that "Daren was 
going to represent me with this real estate sale." (Id. 24: 18-20.) At no point did Mr. Long 
disclose to Mr. Cannon the nature of the zoning. (Id. 16: 13-24.) 
This December 2010 signed agreement was never produced by Mr. Long in discovery. 
Instead, after the Path transaction was closed, Mr. Long sent Mr. Cannon a "Sellers 
Representation Agreement" for Cannons' signature. (Cannon Dep. Ex. 2.) Section 11 of the 
Agreement directed the Defendants to prepare an MLS listing, including a "Property Data Sheet" 
that would among other things list the zoning of the property.2 (Id.) Even though the Defendants 
had in effect been representing Cannons for approximately six months, Defendants never 
performed this duty and never listed the property on the MLS. (Defs Resp. To Disc. Olsen Ex. 5.) 
2 A blank "Property Data Sheet" will be provided to the Court. 
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not obtain from Cannons a statement 
required the § et 
al. (Id.) Finally, during this same period, Mr. Long had listed the attached condominium unit# 3 
in the MLS owned by Furniss as "zoned residential." (Id.) 
:Mr. Cannon did not become aware of the problems with the zoning until Path's letter to 
him in December of 2011 (about seven months after the transaction closed.) (Cannon Dep. 16-
17.) Mr. Cannon subsequently corresponded with Mr. Long by e-mail. (Cannon Dep. Ex. 3.) The 
two exchanged e-mails on December 13, 2011, wherein among other things, Mr. Long admitted 
that "had" the zoning issue been "known and disclosed," Cannons would have had to pursue the 
conditional use permit, "wait until all the hearings were over and it would be very likely that your 
price would have gone down further." (Id.) Mr. Long further indicates that Cannons were 
"operating illegally" (when Cannons owned the property). Mr. Long provides additional advice 
and confidential information that appears to exceed what is allowed under the "dual agency" 
requirements ofldaho law. 
After Cannons agreed to rescind the contract and take back the property (which now 
included the improvements made by Path), they again relisted the property for sale with a realtor. 
Acting under a fictional name (including signatures), Rod Furniss made an offer of $70,000 to 
repurchase the property from Cannons, which was accepted.3 (Cannon Dep. 51-54, Ex. 4.) A 
little over $7,000 of that amount was paid by Cannon toward real tor, closing and title fees. (Id. 
Ex. 5.) Cannons expended approximately $10,000 to $15,000 fees in defending against Path's 
claims. (Id. 42:7-12.) They obtained approximately $9,000 in payments from Path during the 
course of the Finance agreement. (Amended Complaint.) 
Again, the record Mr. Furniss's role in this transaction will be supplemented with his and other relevant 
witness testimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
There are Material Facts in Dispute as to Whether the Defendants 
Statutory Duties which Constitute Negligence Per Sc. 
their 
The Defendants attempt to take advantage of an obvious inadvertent and harmless 
omission in suggesting that Plaintiff is not claiming negligence per se for Defendant violation of 
its duties set forth under IC § 54-2087. Although the statute is not specifically referenced in the 
"negligence per se" cause of action, the relevant provisions of the statute are spelled out in the 
previous paragraphs which were "incorporated" into the "negligence per se" claim. There's 
simply no way that Defendants can claim ignorance or lack of notice that Plaintiff's "negligence 
per se" somehow excludes these referenced duties, and any other statutory duty. 
Idaho law has long allowed negligence and/or the "standard of care" to be established by 
showing a violation of the applicable regulations: 
In Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative regulations may define the 
applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and regulations may 
constitute negligence per se. A court may adopt 'as the standard of conduct of a 
reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative 
regulation .... The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is 
to conclusively establish the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence .... " 
lessens the plaintiffs burden only on the issue of the 'actor's departure from the standard 
of conduct required of a reasonable man. Thus, the elements of duty and breach are taken 
away from the jury. 
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52 122 P.3d 308,311 (2005) (citations omitted) 
The elements of a common law negligence action are (1) a duty, recognized by law, 
requiring the defendant to confonn to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; 
and ( 4) actual loss or damage. 
Id. 
Idaho law recognizes a t01i for realtor's breach of any of the "mandated" statutory duties, 
"irrespective" of the contract, including those listed in IC § 54-2087. Sumpter v. Holland 
Realty, Inc. 140 Idaho 349, 353 93 P.3d 680,684 (2004). 
Potentially relevant claims under the realtor's statutory duties include the following: 
54-2087. DUTIES TO A CLIENT. If a buver or seller enters into a written contract for 
representation in a regulated real estate transaction, that buyer or seller becomes a client 
to whom the brokerage and its licensees owe the following agency duties and obligations: 




(4) To promote the best interests of the client in good faith, honesty and fair 
dealing including, but not limited to: 
(a) Disclosing to the client all adverse material facts actually known or 
which reasonably should have been known by the licensee; ... 
(8) The duties set forth in this section are mandatory and may not be waived or 
abrogated, either unilaterally or by agreement. 
Additional and similar duties are contained under IC § 54-2086 "Duties to customer," 
which includes a requirement that the realtor "perform ministerial acts to assist the buyer or seller 
in the sale or purchase of real estate." Id. (a) 
Under IC§ 54-2083(1), "Adverse material facts means a fact that would significantly 
affect the desirability or value of the property to a reasonable person or which establishes a 
reasonable belief that a party to the transaction is not able to or does not intend to complete that 
pmty's obligations under a real estate contract." 
IC § 54-2085 requires proper disclosure of the type of agency being provided, and tot 
provide "at the first substantial business contact" an "agency disclosure brochure." 
Defendants absurdly suggest that IC § 54-2087(7), not requiring an agent to "conduct an 
independent inspection of the property" or "verify the completeness of any statement or 
representation made regarding a property" somehow absolving themselves from their 
responsibilities under the remaining provisions of the code. Again, the very next provision IC§ 
54-2087(8) explicitly states that such duties are "mandatory" and cannot be waived. 
Regardless of the provisions ofIC § 54-2087(7), there are at least materially disputed 
facts that Defendants violated other statutory duties. Mr. Long listed himself as the "listing 
agent" and the "sellers agent" in the REPC. He even had Cannons sign a "Seller Representation 
Agreement" after the transaction had closed and even though he had approached Cannons many 
months prior to the transaction about selling the prope1ty (itself a violation of the statute.) 
(Cannon Dep. :5-22 Ex. 2.) Section 11 of the Seller Representation Agreement, which was 
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requires the agent to learn and disclose the wning on tlte property. Long never performed this 
most basic and ministerial act in the transaction. 
Moreover, Long foiled to prepare a "listing agreement" which also would have required 
him to learn and disclose the zoning on the property. Additionally, he failed to prepare a 
"Property Condition Disclosure" which is required for any sale of residential property in the State J 
of Idaho under I.C. 55-2504, et al., which would have been an clear indication to Path that this 
was a residential property. 
In essence, had Mr. Long performed his most basic duties, i.e. the completion of these 
statutory and contractual obligations, his clients, both Path and the Cannons would have been 
fully aware of the zoning issues with the property. Thus, regardless of any "non-duty" to 
"conduct an independent inspection of the property," the zoning of the property "reasonably 
should have been known" by Mr. Long. Further, he was most certainly aware and even admitted 
in an e-mail that the zoning would "affect the desirability" and even the "sales price" of the 
property. Put simply, this infom1ation should have 1) been known and 2) been disclosed. 
Finally, IC § 54-2087(7) and the "Buyer Representation Agreement" (which Mr. Long had Path 
sign and back date) certainly does not excuse the Defendants fraudulent misrepresentations, as 
discussed infra. 
Path's misrepresentation claims certainly have bearing on its "good faith and fair dealing" 
claim, which as indicated above is also a required duty under statute. There are at least material 
issues of fact as to whether Defendants were dealing in good faith with either Path or Health. 
Mr. Long never disclosed the agency relationship that he had with either Path or Cannon until 
after the transaction was complete. This apparent conflict meant that he was not dealing with 
these parties honestly, with full disclosure, and with arms length. The dilemma that Mr. Long 
created in this regard is demonstrated in his e-mails to Joseph Cannon. (Cannon Dep. Ex. 3.) His 
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Defendants have come no where close to proving to the Court under the strict summary 
judgment burden that Path's negligence claims should be dismissed. Their motion should be 
denied. 
II. There arc Material Issues of Fact as to \Vhcthcr Def end ants Violated their 
Contractual Duties. 
As admitted in Defendants' brief, a realtor's contractual duties encompass most of their 
statutory duties. The liabilities of breach of contract and negligence are interrelated, perhaps only 
differing in available remedies discussed infra. A good discussion of the similarities of per sc 
negligence and breach of contract claims, as it pertains to realtors, is contained in Sumpter v. 
Holland Realty, Inc. 140 Idaho 349, 353 93 P.3d 680, 684 (2004). It is again worth noting the 
Defendants' failure to perform the written instructions of the "Sellers Representation Agreement" 
which would have required them to learn and disclose the zoning information on the property. 
III. Defendants Errantly Claim that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act Docs Not 
Apply when Idaho Authority Directly on Point Suggests Othenvisc. 
Defendants argue that Idaho Code§ 48-605(1) precludes application of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. That is a misstatement of the statute. The stated exception is for the 
state public utility commission, regulatory bodies and officers and is not geared towards 
consumers ofreal estate services. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act can apply in real estate transactions. White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356. 
363-64 (Idaho 2004). See also Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 259 P. 3d 595, 604-06 (Idaho 
2011). 
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As noted in Path's complaint and infi'a, as a part of their settlement, Cannons' agreed to 
assign any claims that it had against the Defendants to Path. 
It is settled in Idaho that "choses in action are generally assignable." An assignment of 
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right to the cause of action, and the assignee becomes the real party in interest. Thereafter, 
[ o ]nly the assignee may prosecute an action on the chose in action. 
Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani, 293 P.3d 661, 665 (2013) ( citations 
omitted) 
Having become the "real party in interest" and the only party with the "right" to "prosecute" the 
action, the alleged "causes of action," naturally, all pertain to Path. Path's first "Prayer for 
Relief' further notifies the Defendants and the Court as such, by seeking: 
A monetary judgment against Defendant Long compensating Path for any 
costs, losses or other damages resulting from Long or his agent's breach of contract, 
negligence and violations of the Consumer Protection Act as it pertains to Path and 
Cannons (for which Path is the assignee of Cannons' claims)4 
Path Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief1 1 (emphasis added) 
The Defendants' argument that no claims have been plead with regard to Cannons is 
therefore in error and not retlective of what is indicated in the complaint, and in accordance with 
"well settled" Idaho law. 
V. There arc Material Issues of Fact as to Whether the Defendants Committed 
Fraudulent Misrepresentations. 
The Defendants' claim that fraud or misrepresentation was "not plead with particularity" 
is a puzzling one, given the fact that the elements of the cause of action are stated almost 
verbatim to what is contained in TD.TI § 4.60. In addition, Path plead several specific types and 
variations of Defendants' misrepresentations. Path Amended Complaint 152(a)-(g). 
4 Note that Path has not alleged a misrepresentation claim as it pertains to Cannons. 
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Carpenter and Dave Carpenter indicated that on numerous occasions before and all the way up to 
the day of closing Mr. Long had assured that the property was properly zoned for their intended 
use. The Carpenters may not have been avvare of the official terms of art, but they were certainly 
cognizant of the vital importance of being able to have the right zoning in place for their 
business. It was certainly a "material issue" of the contract. The Carpenters further testified that 
had they known the true nature of the zoning on the prope1iy, they would have never completed 
the purchase. Indeed, they had many other properties they were considering. 
Regardless of whether Mr. Long was aware of the zoning or not, the fact that he assured 
Path that the property was properly and appropriately zoned for their use (i.e. commercial use, 
commercially rated, office space, business use) itself constitutes misrepresentation. If Mr. Long 
did not truly know the zoning on the property, that is what he should have disclosed to Path. The 
Carpenters were emphatic in their testimony that at no point did Mr. Long suggest otherwise, and 
further, at no point did Mr. Long advise them to "check with the City." In fact, Mr. Long's 
continued assurances is what kept the Carpenters from "checking" with the City. 
Moreover, the facts suppo1iing Path's claim go beyond that of what the Carpenters 
claimed they were told. There is some compelling evidence, taken all together that strongly 
suggest that Mr. Long was fully aware of the zoning situation, including the following: 
1) Mr. Long was a life long friend of Rod Furniss who owned the property prior to 
Cannons and who in fact referred Cannons to Long to list the property. Furniss is the one who 
insisted on keeping the condominium complex containing the property zoned for residential use 
and convinced the City to give him a conditional use permit to use the property as his business 
under very limited circumstances. Long had been to visit Furniss on many occasions at the 
property. 
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3) Unlike what he did for unit# 3, Mr. Long did not complete a listing agreement or put 
the property on the MLS, even though he had agreed to list the property months before Path 
purchased the property. 
4) Mr. Long had Troy Carpenter sign the "Buyers Representation Agreement" (i.e. with 
all of the provisions that Defendants' are now trying to rely on to excuse him) until after the 
transaction had closed, and further requested that Troy "back date" the document as a "favor" to 
a friend. 
5) Mr. Long did not have Cannons sign a listing agreement ( or if he did, it was never 
produced.) Further Long did not have Cannons sign a "Sellers Representation Agreement" until 
after the transaction had closed. 
6) Mr. Long drafted the REPC -- and in his hand writing included language that the 
"parties were aware of the zoning on the property and its limitations." The language is 
sufficiently vague, not indicating the actual zoning of the property making it misleading. (It is 
also further evidence that this was a material issue in the contract.) Further, Mr. Long never 
advised Path of this language, nor reviewed it with them. 
All of these and more are facts that portend to the possibility of misrepresentation that 
belongs to the consideration of the jury. 
VI. Theories and Facts Supporting Damages 
The consideration of damages requires some perspective. Path made it clear that it would 
have never purchased the property if it was aware of the zoning restrictions. In other words, had 
the Defendants performed their duties, Path would have never undertaken the obligation of 
purchasing the property and all of its significant ramifications. Once Path did purchase the 
property and became aware of the zoning issues (which nearly resulted in its eviction), it pursued 
its options to correct the wrongs that had been done. This first included going through the 
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In their summary judgment motion, Defendants appear to suggest that Path should be 
it 
penalized for pursuing its options to mitigate the harms that were clone. Once Path became aware 
of the present and future problems with this property, they were under no duty to simply "live" 
with the situation, i.e. make the best of it and take the chance that when the time came to sell the 
property, it could get the same purchase price. Based on their meetings with the City, whether it 
ended up being the case or not, Path had a legitimate reason to believe that there would be no 
more conditional use permits issued for that property, essentially having the effect of nullifying 
the value of the property. Path had every right to pursue their legal remedies for wrongs that had 
been done to them to remove them from that situation and to recover damages for of its related 
harms. In addition, as a part of settlement of the claims against them, Cannons agreed to assign 
their claims against the Defendants to Path. As such, as detailed below, the Defendants' 
wrongful conduct resulted in multiple types of harms to both Path and Cannons, in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
A. Negligence Per Se 
As noted il?fra, duty and breach under "Negligence Per Se" are presumed. All that is left 
for the jury to determine is the amount of damages caused by the breach of duty. The 
Defendants' negligence allows for damages that were "proximately" caused by the conduct 
including damages not "contemplated" or "foreseen" at the time of contract. White v. Unigard 
Mut. Ins. Co. At 97-99. Indeed: 
The general rule of damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all detriment 
caused whether it could have been anticipated or not ... one who commits a wrongful act 
is liable for all the direct injury resulting from such act, although such resulting injury 
could not have been contemplated as a probable result of the act done. 
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Idaho's jury instruction manual identifies various types of"proximate" damages that 
could be applicable in this case, including "economic" damages such as past and future earnings 
lost as a result of the injury, or opportunity costs, as well as non-economic damages such as the 
suffering of physical and mental pain. IDJI2d § 9.01. 
Defendants' reliance on the "economic loss rule" to prevent Path's recovery of damages 
under negligence is utterly misplaced. This rule only applies where "where the sole allegation is 
that the defendant prevented the plaintiff from gaining a purely economic advantage" Aardema v. 
US. Dairy Systems, Inc., 215 P.3d 505, 515; 147 Idaho 785, 795 (2009) (emphasis added). In 
addition, such damages from "loss of value" are allowed when such claims are "parasitic" to the 
injury caused -- i.e. they are connected to the non-economic injury. Di(ffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995). There is no evidence in 
this case that Path is "only" alleging that Defendants' conduct prevent Path from obtaining an 
economic advantage. Even then, the "special relationship" that exists between a realtor and his 
customer may even justify and exception to the economic rule. Id. 
Finally an injured party in tort is entitled to "general damages" for anticipated damages 
from a tort that need not be alleged, as well as "special damages" or "compensatory" damages 
awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for hann sustained. Restat 2d r~f 
Torts, §§ 903, 910. Finally, there is authority in Idaho suggesting that a Realtor's violation of 
statutory duties, in pmiicular his duties to "exercise reasonable skill and care" and specifically 
including the duty of "disclosing facts within his knowledge material to the transaction which 
might affect his principal' s rights and interest or influence his actions" should at the very least 
deprive him from his commission earned in the sale. Schroeder v. Rose, 108 Idaho 707, 710, 701 
P.2d 327, 330 (1985). 
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obligations that were incurred by wrongfully entering into the purchase contract. Path mitigated 
its damages by pursuing action against Cannons to rescind the purchase contract. Path and 
Cannons ultimately agreed to a rescission. However, Defendants should not be able to benefit 
from Path's mitigation. Defendants should have to reimburse Path the greater of the lost value in 
the property, or costs that it incurred during the time that it owned the property -- including its 
mitigation costs. Damages should, of course, also include funds that it paid to obtain the 
conditional use permit, (both incurred in the actual moving and also expenses to move its 
business, i.e. notification to its customers and clients), costs made in improving and repairing the 
property and at least some of the funds that it paid toward the purchase price. Finally, it should 
include the attorneys fees and court costs incurred to reach resolution with Cannons. 
Cannons' proximately caused damages include expenses and losses resulting from the 
rescinded contract with Path. After having the property returned to them unexpectedly, Cannons 
ended up selling the property at a significantly reduced price than what they had purchased it. As 
a proximate cause of Defendants' failures, Cannons should be compensated for that lost benefit 
of their bargain with Path. At the very least, Cannons should also be reimbursed its realtor & 
title fees for having to re-sell the property, i.e. as a part of its "restitution costs." Cannons should 
also be compensated for attorney fees and costs for having to defend against Path's claims, again, 
which directly stemmed from the Defendant's wrong doing. 
Finally, given the "presumed" damages from the Defendants' "negligence per se," the 
jury may award any "general damages" that it believes is justified and warranted, even though 
such damages are not plead. 
B. Breach of Contract. 
One measure of damages from a breach of contract is based on the "expectation interest" 
of the i1~ured party, as determined by a) "loss of value" caused by the breach, b) any other 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 18 
cost not 
§ 101 Idaho p 
278 (1980) (injured party entitled to damages "foreseeable" at the time of contract). However, an 
"alternative" to this measure of damages are "damages based on reliance interest." Rest. Of Law, 
7nd r<o··tr .~ "49· ~ , L rt . • -:; .) • 
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in§ 347, the injured party has a right 
to damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for 
performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with 
reasonable certainty that the injured paiiy would have suffered had the contract been 
performed. 
It is under this measure of damages that Path can obtain the moving expenses and 
expenses incurred in making improvements to the property. Such costs were incmTed in reliance 
upon Path's contract with Long, which, if properly performed, Path would have never purchased 
the property and never had incurred such costs. Additionally, Path incurred "actual" or 
"consequential costs" incurred in obtaining a conditional use permit. Those costs were certainly 
"foreseeable" and exist regardless of whether Path would have chosen to keep the property or 
not. 
Cannons' "reliance costs" include the payments that they anticipated receiving under the 
contract that they had with Path for the purchase of the building. Had the Defendants properly 
executed their contractual duties, there would have been no purchase and finance agreement 
along with its anticipated payments. Cannon would have not expected these payments and would 
have been able to pursue other options with the Property. Cannons suffered "actual" or 
"consequential damages" in the attorney fees and costs it incurred in having to defend against 
Path's claims. Finally, Cannons should be reimbursed the realtor and title fees for having to 
locate another buyer for the property. 
C. Damages Under the Consumer Protection Act 
The civil remedies under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICP A) are provided under 
Idaho Code § 48-608, which allow wronged parties to recover "actual" and "punitive" damages. 




"just and necessary" and has the option in its discretion to award punitive damages in cases of 
"repeated or flagrant violations.5" Id. In essence, the ICPA is both about remedying wrongs done 
to the consumer -- both in actual damages and penalizing the wrong doer, including preventing 
the violator from benefitting from the wrongful acts. 
Appropriate damages under the ICP A include at the very least $1,000 for each and every 
time the Defendants violated the act ( either for Path or Cannons). It also should include a 
disgorgement of any compensation paid to Defendants, i.e. their real estate commission. Further, 
there is no reason why the actual damages provided Jor under breach of contract and negligence 
per se should not apply to an ICP A violation. 
D. Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
The measure of Damages for misrepresentation include the following: 
(1) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to recover as damages in an 
action of deceit against the maker the pecuniary loss to him of which the 
misrepresentation is a legal cause, including: 
(a) the difference between the value of what he has received in the transaction and 
its purchase price or other value given for it; and 
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the recipient's reliance 
upon the misrepresentation. 
(2) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business transaction is also 
entitled to recover additional damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract 
with the maker, if these damages are proved with reasonable certainty. 
Rest. Of Law, 2'";, Contr. § 549. 
In essence, damages from the misrepresentation include basic damages available in tort. 
But it also includes other types of damages pertinent to this case. In particular, Defendants could 
be required to provide Path the expected "benefit" of the contract. Such a remedy is fmiher 
explained in American Jurisprudence 2d § 359: 
5 Note that the punitive damages provision under IC § 48-608 does not require that the complaint be 
amended. 
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Thus, if it proves fraud, Path is entitled to the benefit that it would have received had the 
fraud not occurred, i.e. "affirming" contract. This would include the value that Path would have 
obtained for properly zoned property, including its ultimate resale value. This is true regardless 
of whether Path has the property or not. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be 
denied. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
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I am a duly of Idaho, onice in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 14111 day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the coJTect postage 
thereon, or by causing the saine to be delivered in accordance with Rule r u ), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Donald F. Carey, Esq. 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Dr, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-13 88 
FAX: (208) 529-0005 
EMAIL: dfcarey@careyperkins.com 
( ) fax ( ) email 
Counsel.for Defendants Daren Long, All-In 
Inc., dba Re/Max All-In Realtors 
Natl an M. Olsen 
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Attorneys for Defendants Daren Long and Re/Max All-In Realtors 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and 
MEAGAN CANNON, husband and 
wife; DAREN LONG, an individual 
residing in Idaho; ALL-IN INC., dba 
RE/MAX ALL-IN REALTORS, a real 
estate company incorporated in Idaho, 
Dctcndants. 
Case No. CV-2012-2195 
MOTION TO STRJKE 
COME NOW, Defendants Daren Long and All-In Inc., dba Re/Max All-In 
Realtors, bv and throu2h their counsel of record" and hcrebv move to strike. or have the 
,,/ ._,.., , "' , 
Court disregard. inadmissablc portions of the PlaintifTs Response in Opposition to 
Defendants· Motion for Summary Judgment and in supporting documents. As the Idaho 




Evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must be admissible. Hecla }vfin. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 
122 Idaho 778, 785, 839 P.2d 1192, 1199 (1992). This threshold question 
~f nd1n:sn:i..1·1:+u o+ L>v1·den°"' , .... ,,,..+ bn d"' 0 1·darl "b""~O""' P"Oceo.d;nrr to th.c> V a 1 1 ;:)lU HJ l \. v 1 ........ lllU;:)t \. ........ \.U \.li J.\., J. \. l /S t lllv 
ultimate issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate." Ryan v. 
Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24, 27 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). Or, as stated 
in Ryan v. Beisner: 
[I]f the admissibility of evidence presented in support of or in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment is raised by the court on its own motion or on 
objection by one of the parties, the court must first make a threshold determination 
as to the admissibility of the evidence before proceeding to the ultimate issue, 
whether summary judgment is appropriate. 
123 Idaho at 45, 844 P.2d at 27. 
Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, 2014 Ida. LEXIS 50, *33-*34(2014). Defendants 
object to the following: 
1. Any references to facts solely suppmicd by reference to the Amended 
Complaint. The Amended Complaint is not verified. Plaintiff "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." IDAHO R. C1v. P. 56( e ). Such evidence 
may consist of affidavits or depositions, but 'the Comi will consider only that material .. 
. which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial."' 
Harris v. State, Department ofHealth & We(fare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 
1158-59 (1992). 
Motion to Strike - 31 
Plaintiffs statement that property on or about 201 Lon 
IS at 
page does not provide the date of the closing. Neither Plaintiff or Defendants 
have introduced any evidence regarding the precise date the transaction went to closing. 
3. Plaintiff's references to the residential nature of the other units in the 
building at 480 West Sunnyside on page 4 of the response. The deposition transcript 
pages cited at the end of the page do not discuss the nature of the other units. 
4. Plaintiffs representation on page 5 of the response that "after Path moved 
into the facility", Defendant Long has him sign both the "Seller Representation 
Agreement" and ''the actual Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement". First, neither 
Plaintiff or Defendants have introduced any evidence regarding the precise date the 
transaction went to closing. Second, neither Plaintiff or Defendants have introduced any 
evidence regarding the precise date Path to Health moved into the location. Third, and 
most importantly, although Troy Carpenter claims he backdated the documents (and he 
would not have signed a Seller's Representation Agreement but a Buyer's), he did not 
testify that they were signed after closing or after Plaintiff moved into the location. See 
Aff. Carey ISO MSJ at ii 8, at Ex. D at 31-36. 1 
5. Plaintiff's representations at page 6 of the response regarding what City of 
Idaho Falls representatives or employees, Planning and Zoning council members, or City 
council members allegedly told Path are hearsay and inadmissible. IDAHO R. Evm. 801, 
1He does not recall the precise date he signed the documents. Id. at Ex. D at 35. Joseph Scott 
Cannon, however. remembered that Carpenter had initialed the Purchase and Sale Agreement when he 
signed the document on May 23, 2011. Id. at Ex.Cat 26-·29. 
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inadmissable or contains inadmissable material. First. Plaintiff has not submitted 
evidence that the minutes of the Planning Division's meeting were approved. See Ex. 4 at 
p. l (noting that the prior minutes were "approved"). Therefore, as a record, it lacks 
reliability Second, Plaintiff has not shown how the record is relevant. IDAHO R. Evm. 
401, and 402. Section 5-10 C.ofthe City ofidaho Falls Zoning Ordinance does not give 
the Planning Council the authority to approve or disapprove the type of conditional use 
permit that Path to Health sought. That power is vested in the City Council. Therefore, 
whether individual members might or might not remained on the planning commission or 
vvcmld have recommended such an action at an unknown date in the future is irrelevant 
and additionally speculative. See Zoning Ordinance, section 5-10 B. and C., available at: 
http://www.idahofallsidaho.gov/wwwroot/userfiles/files/planning/ordinance 1941.pdf (last 
accessed February 20, 2014 ). 
7. Additionally, Plaintiff's own representations regarding Defendants' alleged 
misrepresentations would have caused "council members [to] express deep concerns 
about allowing a conditional use permit when there had been 'misrepresentations by the 
rcaltor' as cited on page 6 of Plaintiff's response. First, the members of the planning 
commission are not council members. Second, the commission is not an adjudicative 
body and could not determine whether there were, in fact, misrepresentations. This 
statement is based on hearsay, irrelevant, or more prejudicial than probative and should be 
struck. IDAHO R. !D. 401,402,403, 801, and 802. 
to Strike - 4 1 
8. Plaintiffs statements at the bottom of page 6 and continuing on to 7 
as are 
supported by the unverified Amended Complaint. 
9. Plaintiff has not produced the assignment alleged to exist which would 
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causes of action and damages. References to said assignment and any alleged claims or 
damages of the Cannons should be struck. See Response at pp. 6, 13 (citing the Amended 
Complaint). Besides the fact that the assignment is only described in the unverfied 
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cannot prove the contents of a writing by testimony. 
IDAHOR. Evm. 1002. 
10. Plaintiffs statement that "[a]t no point did Mr. Long disclose to Mr. 
Cannon the nature of the zoning" at page 7 of the Response should be struck. Cannon 
was the seller, not Long, and Plaintiff has neither established that Long knew what the 
zoning was or had a duty to determine what the zoning was for the unit. The statement is 
not supported by fact or law and additionally appears to be a deliberate misstatement of 
the record. Cannon, in fact, testified that Rod Furniss, who sold the property to him, did 
not disclose what he may have known about the zoning. Aff. Carey ISO MSJ at Ex.Cat 
16. 
1 I. Plaintiffs statement that '·[T]his December 2010 signed agreement was 
never produced by Mr. Long in discovery" is vague as to what document is specified and 
not make sense given the context of the subject sale is in or about May - June 2011. 
12. Plaintiff's statement that "Long did not obtain from Cannons a "Property 
Motion to Stnke - 5 
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required for residential al page 7 and item number 3 on 15. It 
it was 
13. The residential listing at Exhibit 5 to the Affidavit of Counsel filed in 
support of Plaintiff's response. Plaintiff has not shown hmv the listing for a separate unit 
is probative or relevant. The listing is dated June 22, 2011, nearly a month after Cannon 
testified that he signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement! See Aff. Carey ISO MSJ at Ex. 
C at 26-29. The listing does not show that Long had knowledge of the zoning at the time 
Plaintiff contracted to buy a unit in the building. IDAHO R. Evm. 401, 402. Further, 
Plaintiff seems to assume that zoning can never be "mixed use". Plaintiff also 
conveniently ignores that he has no evidence that Long assumed a duty in that listing to 
verify the zoning. To the contrary the listing itself disclaims a duty to verify the 
information in the listing itself: "Information Herein Deemed Reliable but not 
Guaranteed''. See Ex. 5. 
14. Plaintiffs statement that Cannons ''obtained approximately $9.000 in 
payments from Path to Health" which is not supp01ied by evidence. See Response at p. 8 
(citing the Amended Complaint). 
15. Plaintiff's statement, at item number 1 on page 14 of the response regarding 
the relationship between Long and Furniss. This is hearsay and unsupported by 
admissible evidence in the record. I DA.HOR. Evm. 80 L 802. 
l Plaintiff's statement, at item number 2 on page ] 5 of the response regarding 
the listing of another unit in the building. As discussed at paragraph 13, above, the listing 
Motion to Strike - 6 
is not relevant or probative. 
l at 4 on 15 
had a "Buyers Representation Agreement" after the had 
·'closed". First neither Plaintiff or Defendants have introduced any evidence regarding 
the precise date the transaction went to closing. Second, Troy Carpenter indicated in his 
- - .. ... 
deposition that he recalled signing "one of those agreements that you had to sign with the 
realtor that he's going to represent me" prior to the closing. Aff. Carey ISO MSJ at Ex. B 
at 23-24. There is no evidence to support this statement. 
18. Plaintiff's statement, at item 5 on page 15 of the response that Long had the 
Cannons sign a "Sellers Representation Agreement" after the transaction had "closed". 
First, neither Plaintiff or Defendants have introduced any evidence regarding the precise 
date the transaction went to closing. Second, Joseph Scott Cannon indicated in his 
deposition that he recalled signing "one of those agreements that you had to sign with the 
realtor that he's going to represent me" prior to the closing. Aff. Carey ISO MSJ at ii 7 at 
Ex. Cat 23-24. There is no evidence to support this statement. 
19. Plaintiff's statement, at item 6 on page 15 of the response is unsupported by 
evidence, and is additionally speculative. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants move for the items listed above to be struck, and not 
considered as evidence in respect of Defendants' motion for summary judgement, and for 
such further and other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
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SUBMITTED AND DATED this 21 st day 2014. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Strike on: 
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485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208)-523-4650 
Attorneysj,H Plaintiff 
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Altornevs for Defendants Daren Long anJ Re/Max All-In Realtors . ~ 
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Partnership, 
Plain ti fl~ 
vs. 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife; DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; ALL-
IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALTORS, a real estate company 
incorporated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CV-2012-2195 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
. DEFENDANTS DAREN LONG 
AND ALL-IN INC.'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants' reply brief is intended to rebut specific portions of Plaintiff's briefing. 
Defendants also intend to supply argument at the hearing on this matter. In short, 
SO Defendants Daren and 1\ll-ln Inc. Motion for Summarv Judgment- l 
s largely resorts statements regarding record 
motion to strike regarding their objections to the admissibility of Plaintiffs claims 
regarding the evidence in this matter. This briefing attempts to clarify the law applicable 
to Plaintiffs claims. Defendants continue to maintain that they are entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
a. Count V: Breach of Contract 
Plaintiff claims that Defendants admit that "'a realtor's contractual duties 
encompass most of their statutory duties." Response at 12. Defendants did no such 
thing. That assertion is nonsense. Defendants argued that the statutory duties 
enumerated at section 54-2087 include a contractual duty at ( 1 ), which is to "perform the 
terms of the written agreement with the client". IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2087(1 ). There 
was one written agreement between Defendants and Plaintiff. It contained no provision 
that obligated Defendants to investigate the zoning for Plaintiff contrar) to Plaintiffs 
assertions. See Response at 12. In fact, the contract disclaimed any duty or ability on the 
part of Defendants to provide any such advice. 
Broker cannot waITant the condition of the property to be acquired, or guarantee 
that all material facts are disclosed by the Seller. Broker will not investigate the 
condition of any property including without limitation the status of permits, 
zaning, location of property lines .... and Buyer must satisfy thcmself concerning 
these issues by obtaining the appropriate expert advice. 
ISO Defendants Daren Long and All-In Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment - " 
l 
ir ( emphasis 
~· ,I at 14 
is no breach the contract. 
at at 
s to 
contract and tort notwithstanding, breach of contract requires a contract provision to 
breach. The contract's express term is not contrary to public policy. On the contrary, the 
public policy which supports this provision is articulated in Idaho Code: 
Unless otherwise agreed to in 'Nriting, a brokerage and its licensees owe no ._, "-' ._, 
duty to a client to conduct an independent inspection of the property and owe no 
duty to independently verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement or 
representation made regarding a property. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, a 
brokerage and its licensees owe no duty to conduct an independent investigation of 
either party's financial ability to complete a real estate transaction. 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2087(7). Plaintiff has produced no writing between the parties 
which obligates Defendants to verify the zoning. Plaintiff's argument that this section 
does not abrogate a duty to act in good faith and fair dealing by disclosing what 
'·reasonably should have been known by the licensee" is simply wrong. id. at il 54-
2087( 4)(a). What "reasonably should have been known": is limited by the legislature's 
determination that any obligations to verify statements or representations he in writing. 
In the alternative, that alleged duty only sounds in tort. "If a cause of action for breach of 
a duty based on a contractual promise could also be maintained without the contract by 
virtue of a statutory or common law duty, then the action is founded upon tort, not 
contract'' Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 354, 93 P.3d 680, 685 (2004 ). 
Moreover, Plaintiff has admitted that "I think a hundred out of a hundred people 
walking into that building would have thought it was a commercial office "Aff 
ISO Defendants Daren Long and All-In Inc's Motion for Summary Judgment - 3 
at Eat 51. of 
was it 
colleague and it had been used as a commercial office. Id. at Ex. C at I 16. Plaintiff 
has no admissible evidence that that Defendants "should have known" about the zoning: 
of the property. See Motion to Strike. Plaintiff's claims in contract should be dismissed. 
b. Count VJ: Negligence Per Se 
Plaintiffs count VI asserts a cause of action based on Idaho Codes section 54-
2041. By referring to this as an "inadvertent and harmless omission'' [by not pleading 
Idaho Code section 54-2087] Plaintiff concedes that this Count has no merit and should 
be dismissed. See Response at 9. 
c. l'/egligence and Negligence Per Se (as implied or alleged as breach of contract) 
1. Plaint[ff's claims are barred by the economic loss rule 
'--' 
Plaintiff has failed to articulate any property damage or bodily injury that Plaintiff 
sustained that its alleged economic damages are parasitic to. See Response at 17. 
Plaintiff certainly did not allege any such damages in its unverified Amended Complaint, 
nor has it provided any admissible evidence of any such alleged damages otherwise. 
"Economic Joss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is 
the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and 
consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers v. Cessna, 97 Idaho 348, 351-352, 544 
P.2d 306, 309-310, 309 (I 975). 
In the alternative, Plaintiff claims that there is a "special relationship" that justifies 
ISO Defendants Daren n Inc.'s Modon -4 
It not to 
are not 
relationship" the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
There are two exceptions to the general rule which prevents a party from 
recovering purely economic loss in a tort claim; those two exceptions are, (1) 
where a special relationship exists between the parties, or (2) where unique 
circumstances require a reallocation of the risk. Just's, Inc., 99 Idaho at 470, 583 
P.2d at 1005. A special relationship exists "where the relationship between the 
patties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty." Duffin, 126 Idaho 
at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. The special relationship exception to the economic loss 
rule is an extremely narrow exception which applies in only limited circumstances. 
This Court has found a special relationship to exist in only two situations, ( 1) 
"where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services[;]" and (2) 
"where an entity holds itself out to the public as having expertise regarding a 
specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its 
performance of that function." Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001; see 
!vtcAlvain v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976); 
see also Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. 
Aardema v. US Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,792,215 P.3d 505, 512 (2009). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a realtor is not a "professional" under Idaho law, in 
large part because of limited training for the job and the lack of a higher education 
prerequisite for the job. Sumpter v. Holland Realty, inc., 140 Idaho 349, 353, 93 P.3d 
680, 683-84 (2004). 
While the Court has not defined specifically identified whether rcaltors are "quasi-
professional", this case is distinguishable from the case which led to that terminology: 
lYfcAlvain v. General Insurance Company of America, 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 
(1976). 
ISO Defendants Daren Long and All-In lnc.'s Motion Summary 
cover the value of the inventory. A fire destroyed the inventory 
coverage was insufficient to cover the loss. This Court held: 
When an insurance agent performs his services negligently, to the insured's 
injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as would an 
attorney, architect, engineer, physician or any other professional who 
negligently performs personal services. 
Blahdv. RichardH Smith, 141 Idaho 296, JOl, 108 P.3d 996, 100l (2005) (quoting 
lvlcAlvain at 780, 554 P.2d at 958). 
First, it should be noted that under the Sumpter decision, an insurance agent would 
presumably now be deemed a quasi-professional, since higher education is not required 
as a prerequisite for licensure and agent licensing requirements are not onerous. See 
Idaho Department of Insurance, Idaho Producer and Adjuster General Licensing 
Information, http://www.doi.idaho.gov/producer/producer info.aspx (last accessed 
February 2L 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 41-1001 et seq. Second, in McAlvain, the agent 
affirmatively undertook to determine the insurable value of the Insured's inventory, 
something is specifically vvithin the realm of his expertise. Here, the Idaho legislature 
has sought to limit any arguably professional duties that potential litigants may seek to 
impose upon realtors. Conditions of the property are outside of a realtor's expertise and a 
condition of the property which the legislature has sought to remove from a realtor's 
responsibilities. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2087(7). In other words, if realtors are 
quasi- or part professionals, what they are professional in is something other than what 
Plaintiff has claimed in this case. 
ISO Defendants Daren Long and All-In Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment - 6 
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1180 (8th Ed.). A special relationship does not exist under the exception articulated in 
AfcAlvain. 
The second exception is ·'where an entity holds itself out to the public as having 
expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance 
on its performance of that function.'' Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301, 108 P.3d at 1001. 
Plaintiffs have introduced no evidence that Defendants held themselves out to the public 
as zoning experts. 
It should also be noted that this exception is based in equity. Plaintiff is a 
naturopathic company. Presumably its principles, Troy Carpenter and Dave Carpenter, 
are at least quasi-professional in their own right Plaintiff essentially claims that it was a 
helpless babe in the wood and apparently unable to read a contract when it bought this 
property. There is nothing equitable about imposing additional duties on Defendants 
which are unsupported by law when Plaintiff simply claims that it did not feel the need to 
investigate anything. 
2. The substance of Plaintiff's claims in negligence and negligence per se 
For the most part, Defendants will rely on its prior briefing and oral argument to 
address these claims. Defendants do note, however, that Plaintiff claims that duty and 
breach are taken away from the jury in respect of negligence per se. Response at 16. This 
is only applicable when there is proof of a violation of a precisely articulated duty. 
ISO Defendants Daren Long and All-In Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment- 7 
3 
statute IS a a 
se 
The Court has adopted this as a reasonable man standard. See O 'Guin v. Bingham 
County, 142 Idaho 49, 52 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005). Here, however, where the 
articulated statutory duties beg the question regarding what is a violation, what is 
"reasonable skill and care" remains with the jury and duty and breach are not 
"presumed". 
Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence of what "reasonable skill and care" is 
for a realtor. Plaintiff additionally cites other statutory sections without explaining how 
alleged violation of these sections led to damages. Plaintiff cites to "potentially relevant 
claims". Response at 9. This is a summary judgment motion. Plaintiff's burden is to 
show that the claims are relevant by demonstrating that there is a material dispute of fact 
supported by evidence on each element of its causes of action with respect to the claims. 
Again, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden in its response. 
d. Count VII: Consumer Protection Violation 
Piaintiff provides no support for its argument that Idaho Code section 48-605( l) 
precludes application of the Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff further misreads White v . 
. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356, 363-64 (2004) and Knipe Land Company v. 
Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,259 P.3d 595, 604-606 (2011) to support its stated claims. 
The action under the Consumer Protection Act in White was against the sellers of the 
property, not a real estate broker. White, 140 Idaho at 884- 85, 104 P.3d at 358-359. The 
Reply ]SO Defendants Daren Long and All-In lnc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment 8 
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Idaho at 598, 259 P.3d at 452. Further, there is no indication in Knipe that Knipe raised 
Idaho Code section 48-605(1) as a defense and that it was considered. 
e. Count VIII: Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Covenant ~(Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing 
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants have no fiduciary duty to Plaintiff unless 
those duties are reduced to writing. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2094 (2012). Plaintiff's 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff has not provided any argument regarding the alleged breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing other than what is discussed in its argument 
regarding negligence per se. Plaintiff's separate claim should be dismissed. 
f Count IX· Misrepresentation 
Despite the fact that Plaintiff claims it pleaded its cause of action with 
particularity, the fact that Defendants are arguing in this brief regarding what could be 
read as ''possible" causes of action underscores that is not the case. Plaintiff's response 
does not enlighten the reader as to how there is a material issue of fact on all of the 
elements of each claim that would preclude summary judgment on the possible causes of 
action. Instead, it engages in speculation as to what is the "possibility of 
misrepresentation''. Response at page 15. 
Plaintiff does repeatedly refer to the claim of "misrepresentation". See, e.g. 
Response at J 4 ("the record and evidence provides ample support for at least a disputed 
Reply ISO Defendants Daren Long and All-In Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment- 9 
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cases 
"misrepresentation" claim should be dismissed. See Response at 13 15; Duffin v. 
Idaho Crop Improvement Association, 126 Idaho l 002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 
(1995); see also Afannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927 (2007). Plaintiff has also not disputed 
that negligent misrepresentation is a tort claim, and therefore subject to the economic loss 
rule, and in this case, dismissal. Duffzn, 126 Idaho at 10 IO. 
Plaintiffs remaining potential claims are in fraud. Defendants have objected to 
Plaintiff's representations listed as items 1-6 on pages fourteen (14) through fifteen ( 15) 
of the response. See Motion to Strike. Defendants have also previously noted, in their 
initial briefing, that Plaintiff may not rely on its Amended Complaint as to what the 
"misrepresentations" are. Nonetheless, in its response, Plaintiff attempts to do so. See 
Response at 13. Again, Plaintiff has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to create 
a genuine issue of material fact as to each element to establish its claim of fraud. Country 
Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 600, 150 P.3d 288, 293 (2006). Plaintiff has 
provided no admissible evidence that Defendants knew the actual condition of the 
property and either deliberately intended that Plaintiffs should rely on their statements or 
om1ss10ns Plaintiff has also, significantly, failed to explain why it had "rights to rely 
thereon'' or how self-inflicted damages were caused by the alleged statements and 
om1ss10ns. 
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for the proposition that Defendants should lose their commission in the sale. Schroeder 
was determined in 1985 on the basis that a realtor has a fiduciary duty to clients. Id. 
Since that time, the legislature has determined that a realtor in a regulated real estate 
transaction does not owe a fiduciary duty. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2094 (2012). 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and its previously submitted briefing, Defendants 
respectfully request dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against them. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this 21st day of February, 2014. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
By: 
, o e Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Daren Long and 
Re/Max All-In Realtors 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho Lim-
ited Liability Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife; DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALTORS, a real estate company incor-
porated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CV-2012-2195 
DEFENDANTS DAREN LONG 
AND RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALTORS MOTION TO 
SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, and hereby moves 
this Court for an order allowing Defendants Motion to Strike to be heard less than fourteen 
(14) days after filing the notice of hearing, as set forth in I.R.C.P. 7 (b)(3)(A). 
Defendants believe that Plaintiff will not suffer any prejudice as a result of having this 
motion heard less than fourteen ( 14) days subsequent to its filing. 
I - Defendants Motion to Shorten Time 
this time, the hearing on Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment which is 
the is set to convene on February 
necessitating a hearing less than fourteen days after filing the notice of hearing. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that the Court allow the Motion to 
Strike to be heard on Friday, February 28, 2014, at 9;00 a.m., and for such further and 
additional relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of February, 2014. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
By: 
Donald F. Carey, 
Attorneys for De 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2I5t day of February, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Defendants Motion to Shorten Time by: 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 'E' Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208) 523-4650 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HELA TH, LLP, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife, DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho, 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALOTORS, a real estate company 
incorporated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CR-2012-2195 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants, Daren Long's and RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALOTORS' motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the claims raised by the 
Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP. At the time of the hearing, the Court allowed the Parties additional 
time to supplement the record with testimony relevant to the pending issues. Plaintiff thereafter filed 
a "Supplemental Statement" which referred to deposition testimony as attached to the Supplemental 
Statement. As noted by Defendants' objection, such is not a supplement to the record since the 
deposition testimony is simply attached to an unsworn statement. Accordingly, the Court will not 
consider the Supplemental Statement. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On or about May 18, 2011, the Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP and its principals Dave and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - l 
Suite B 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-2913 
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Facsimile: (208) 529-0005 
E-mail: dfcarey@.careyperkins.com 
E-mail: dlsallak@careyperkins.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Daren Long and Re/Max All-In Realtors 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Partnership, 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and 
MEAGAN CANNON, husband and 
wife; DAREN LONG, an individual 
residing in !daho: ALL-IN INC., dba 
RE/:t\1!\X ALL-IN REALTORS, a real 
estate company incorporated in Idaho. 
Defendants. 
CascNo. CV-201 195 
RESPONSE lN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION 
lNTRODUCTION 
On January 3 L 2014, Defendants properly filed their Motion for Summary 
Jud gm em, In response. Plaintiff filed a motion to continue the summary j udgmcnt 
m 10 Rule Motion· I 
3 
to 56(f) of Idaho Rules of Civil s 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 56(b) provides that Defendants may seek summary judgment at any time "as 
to all or any part" of Plaintiffs claims, provided that Defendants do not seek summary 
judgment less than sixty days before trial, or less, if the trial court sets trial dates after 
that point. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(b ). Rule 56(£) provides, 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the pmiy 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the comi may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as just. 
IDAHO R. Crv. P. 56(t} Plaintiff has not met the standard required under the rule. 
The party seeking the continuance "must do so in good faith by affirmatively 
demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant' s affidavits ... and how 
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery of other means, to 
rebut the rnovant's showing of an absence of a genuine issue of fact." Boise Mode, LLC 
v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd. , 294 P .3d 1111, 1116 (2013) ( quoting Jenkins v. Boise 
Corporation, 141 Idaho 233,239, 108 P.3d 380, ]86 (2005)(intcrnal citation 
omitted)). ··The movant 'has the burden of setting oul what 1Ltrthcr discovery would 
reveal that is essential to justify their opposition,' rnakiug ch.~ar 'what information is 
sought and how it would preclude summary judgment."' Id. ( quoting Jenkins, 141 Idaho 
at 239, 108 P.3d at 386 (internal citations omitted)). 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Ruic 56(0 J\.1otion - 2 
Plaintiff affidavit supporting 
a matter s motion 
Second Plaintiff, in its response in opposition to summary judgment, only claims 
that certain discovery has not been had; it fails entirely to set forth any argument as to 
what information it expects to discover which would preclude summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants. See generally, Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's 56(f) Motion. The response claims that 
''there arc four depositions that are or will be taken this week and next which is expected 
to provide additional testimony and evidence that support Path's claims and/or \Vil! at the 
very least create issues of material fact". Id. at 1. How? Why? This is not an 
"affirmative[] dcmonstrati[ on] why [it] cannot respond to a movant's affidavits ... and 
how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable [it]_ by discovery of other 
means, to rebut the movant' s showing of an absence of a genuine issue of fact.,. As such, 
Plaintiff's motion should be denied. Defendants additionally note that of the depositions 
scheduled afler their motion was filed, the only deposition noticed by Plaintifl of 
Defendant Daren Long, was vacated and was not rescheduled. Affidavit of Donald F. 
Carey in Support of Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Ruic 56(f) Motion at ~15. 
Third, Plaintiff's motion, implicitly, is also a motion to extend discovery in this 
matter and to continue the trial. Discovery cut-off is tomorrow, February 21, 2014 
Order Notice Setting Jury Trial at i! 6. Trial in this matter is set to begin on April 8, 
2014. Id. at ,r Plaintiff has neither asked leave of the Court nor stated g.ood cause for 
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 56(t) Motion - 3 33 
IDAHO 16(b). it has, 
on 
ISO to 56(£) at ,i 6 at It also· a 
for records outside of the time for discovery. Id. Defendants oppose any extension of 
discovery. 
It is Defendants' position that Plaintiff has not been diligent in pursuing its claims. 
In Boise Mode, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "the legal standard governing the 
district comi's exercise of discretion when deciding a Rule 56(£) motion permits 
consideration of the moving part's previous lack of diligence in pursuing discovery." 
Boise "Mode, 294 P.3d at 1117. For example, Daren Long's deposition was not sought 
until aHer Defendants' motion for summary judgment was filed. Aff. Carey ISO 
Opposition to 56( f) Continuance at ,i 5. 
Fourth and finally, Defendants have moved, in part, for summary judgment as a 
matter oClaw on a number of Plaintiffs claims that cannot be cured by any discovery of 
a genuine dispute of material fact. Plaintiffs claims in negligence and negligence per sc 
are barred by the economic loss rule. There is no claim for negligent misrepresentation 
under Idaho law against realtors. By law, realtors do not have a fiduciary duty to their 
clients. Whether or not Plaintiff has stated a claim for fraud is not dependant on any 
discovery by deposition. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff bas stated no reason why these and other claims cannot be 
determined based on the law at this time. 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Ruic Motion - 4 336 
CONCLUSION 
are as a matter 
justice, to have the summary judgment heard ruled on timely trial. 
Plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be denied. 
DATED this 20th day ofFebruary, 2014. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
By: 
Attorneys f 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of February, 2014., I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule 56(!) Motion 
on: 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208)-523-4650 
Atwrneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile@ (208)-524-3391 
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Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-2913 
Telephone: (208) 529-0000 
Facsimile: (208) 529-0005 
P _111,::iil · dfrare,1rcz)cc1reuperkinc 0"'1' .L..I _t!,,,l. .!., _,._: ..L .) \_/ ·(.., J J.. ..L.J.,J.V\,,J.l .l 
E-mail: dlsallak@careyperkins. corn 
Attorneys tor Defendants Daren Long and Re/Max All-In Realtors 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Pmincrship, 
Plain ti fl 
vs. 
JOSEPH SCOT'T CANNON and MEAGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife; DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; 
ALL-IN INC, dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALTORS, a real estate company 
incorporated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF 1DAH0 ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonncvil ) 
Case No. CV-2012-2195 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD F. 
CAREY IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(1) 
JVlOTION 
Donald F. Carey. hav been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I - AffiJavit of Donald . m to Plaintiffs Rule Morion 
\ 
am one of attorneys record for the above case. 
am I 
3. That I am familiar with the file and pleadings that have been generated in this 
case. 
4. That the statements contained within this affidavit are made upon personal 
knowledge. 
5. That of the depositions scheduled to take place after Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed on January 31, 2014, the only deposition noticed by Plaintiff 
was of Defendant Daren Long. This deposition, scheduled to occur on February 18, 2014, 
was vacated and was not rescheduled. A date for Mr. Long's deposition was first requested 
by Plaintiff a week after Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed. 
6. That attached as Exhibit "A'' are true and correct copies of: a Subpoena to 
Randy Water issued February 14, 2014, which seeks to conduct discovery past the discovery 
cut-off date of February 21, 2014; and a Notice of Taking Deposition of Russ Donahoo and 
Subpoena for Deposition of Russ Donahoo which seeks to conduct discovery past the 
discovery cut-off date of February 21, 2014. 
FURTHER your Affiant saith not. 
- Affidavit of Donald F J!1 of Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule Motion 
to 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of February, 2014, I served a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing Affidavit ofDonald F. Carey in Support a/Response in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule 56(/) Motion on: 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 'E' Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208) 523-4650 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ J Hand-Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile@ (208) 524-339 J 
£ '. . 
~ Donal~/ 
Q \JlLES\OPF0 - CASL' l· !LES\26-5:SS - Path to Hcaith v. Long & ReMax" Aff JSO Opp Rule 56(f) v. pd 




Idaho Falls, Idaho 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Faesimile: (208) 524-3 3 91 
ISB # 7373 
Anorneys for Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho Limited) 




Case No. CV-2012-2195 
vs. ) 
) 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN ) 
SUBPOENA FOR DEPOSITION OF 
RUSS DONAHOO 
CANNON, husband and wife, DAREN ) 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; ) 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN ) 
REALTORS, a real estate eompany ) 
incorporated in Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 




3525 MERLIN DR 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404 
You ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO APPEAR before a Notary Public or other person 
authorized to take oaths at your deposition scheduled on March 12, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., at the 
offices of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen, 485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, Idaho, as a witness in the 
above-entitled action. 
SUBPOENA FOR DEPOSITION OF RUSS DONAHOO - 1 3 
NOTIFIED if you at 
111 recover 
the sum of $100 and all damages which the may sustain by your to atiend as a 
Nathan M. Olsen'---------
SUBPOENA FOR DEPOSITION OF RUSS DONAHOO -
ama 111 m 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 14th day of February, 201 I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the persons listed below first class mail, with the concct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule S(b), l.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Donald F. Carey, Esq. 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Dr, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1388 
FAX: (208) 529-0005 
EMAIL: dfcarey@carevperkins.com 
M & M Court Repo1iing Service 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
FAX: (208) 345-8800 
SUBPOENA FOR DEPOSITION OF RUSS DONAHOO 3 
Method of Service: 
( ) mail (/)hand ( ) fax ( ) email 
Counsel for Defendants Daren Long, All-In 
Inc., dba Rel.Max All-In Realtors 
( ) mail ( ) hapd ( vf[ax ( ) email 
Y\~lJL 
Natl{an M. Olse'ir 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
ISB # 7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Path to Heaith, LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




JOSEPH SCOTT CAG1NON and MEAGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-2195 
NOTICE OF TAKING 
DEPOSITION OF RUSS 
DONAHOO 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP, by and through 
its counsel ofrecord, Nathan M. Olsen, Esq., of PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN, will take the 
deposition of Russ Donahoo, at the offices of PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN, 485 "E" Street, 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402, commencing at 9:00 a.m., on Wednesday, March 12, 2014, and 
continuing from time to time until completed, at which place and time you are invited to appear 
and take part in such deposition as you deem proper .. 
The above deposition will be conducted pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
before a Notary Public of the State ofldaho, or such other officer authorized by law to administer 
oaths. 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION OF RUSS DONAHOO l 345. 
PEtttl[,s 7/ ____ _ 
Na than M. 0 lsen V -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 14th day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b ), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Donald F. Carey, Esq. 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Dr, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1388 
FAX: (208) 529-0005 
EMAIL: dfcarey@careyperkins.com 
M & M Court Reporting Service 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
FAX: (208) 345-8 800 
NOTICE OFT AKING DEPOSITION OF RUSS DONAHOO - 2 
Method of Service: 
( ) mail ( v11J_and ( ) fax ( ) email 
Counsel for Defendants Daren Long, All-In 
Inc., dba Re/Afax All-In Realtors 
( ) mail ( ) hand ( vffux ( ) email 
(11 /1 lJ 1(,AL~ 
NathanVM. Olsen 
-346 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
ISB # 7373 
Atiomeys for Plaintiff, Path to Heaith, LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PATH TO HEALTH, LLP, an Idaho Limited) 





vs. ) SUBPOENA FOR RECORDS 
) 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN ) 
CANNON, husband and wife, DAREN ) 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; ) 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN ) 
REALTORS, a real estate company ) 





THE STATE OF IDAHO SENDS GREETINGS TO: 
RANDY WATERS 
700 S. Woodruff 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
You are commanded to produce or permit inspection and copying of records 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 45(b)(2) on or before Tuesday, March 4, 2014, at the offices of 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen, 485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402. In responding to 
request, the following definition shall apply: 
SUBPOENA FOR RECORDS - 1 3 
terms any 
digital or computerized data, or or 
representation, mcluding but not limited to letters, words, pictures, sounds, 
magnetic impulses, symbols, numbers or any combination thereof, whether or not 
visible to the unassisted human eye. This definition shall include, but is not 
limited to, any and all originals, copies or drafts of any and all of the following: 
records, notes, summaries, schedules, contracts, agreements, drawings, blueprints, 
sketches, invoices, orders, acknowledgments, diaries, reports, findings, forecasts, 
tests, appraisals, engineering repo1is, memoranda, medical records, telephone 
recordings, telephone logs, letters, telegrams, telexes, facsimiles, cables, tapes, 
tape recordings, statements, receipts, invoices, check registers, transcripts, 
recordings, photographs, witness statements, pictures, films, videotapes, computer 
programs, models, things and materials of any nature whatsoever. Any document 
which contains any comment, notation, addition, insertion or marking of any kind 
which is not part of another document is to be considered as a separate document. 
You are to produce the following documents or records: 
1. All documents or records in your possession or within your control with regard to 
the real property located at 480 W. Sunnyside, Units 3 and 4, Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
DATED this 141h day of February, 2014. 
SUBPOENA FOR RECORDS - 2 
3 
office in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 1 day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be deiivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Donald F. Carey, Esq. 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Dr, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1388 
FAX: (208) 529-0005 
EMAIL: dfcarey(alcareyperkins.com 
SUBPOENA FOR RECORDS -
Method of Service: 
( ) mail (v) hand ( ) fax ( ) email 
Counsel for Defendants Daren Long, All-In 
Inc., dba Re/Afax All-In Realtors 
-J il Ii 
rr .. t.~ 
Nathan M. Olsen V "-· 
Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
ISB # 7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP 
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JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN ) 
CANNON, husband and wife; DAREN ) 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; ) 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN ) 
REALTORS, a real estate company ) 
incorporated in Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-2012-2195 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP, (Path) offers the following Response in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Strike. In large part, the 19 points made in Defendants' Motion 
editorializes or interprets the statements made in Path's response brief, rather than address what 
is actually on the record. This only provides additional basis why the Court should not grant 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In short, this case should not be tried by affidavit 
and motions, which cannot possibly deal with all of the relevant facts in this case and would be 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE-
and the 
Each of the 19 points in Defendants' motion are addressed below: 
1. Defendants misstate to the Court that Path is "merely" relying upon the allegations set 
forth in the Complaint in responding to their summary judgment. Indeed, Path has provided 
affidavits and sworn deposition testimony in addition to the allegations contained in the 
complaint. Defendants have provided no authority to suggest that Path cannot rely at all on the 
allegations of the complaint. Moreover, Defendants fail to mention that the complaint was 
attached as "exhibit 1" to Dave Carpenter's deposition, and discussed extensively during the 
deposition. (See Dave Carpenter Dep. pp. 88: 20-25,89-113, Ex. 1) 
2. While it is true that there is "no evidence'' that precisely points the date of closing, this 
oversight is easily rectifiable with the introduction of the Closing Documents prepared by the 
title company, which has been produced in discovery and will be presented at trial. In any case, 
Defendants' admission that such evidence may be in dispute provides additional basis for a 
denial of their motion for summary judgment. 
3. Defendants' argument is specious. Defendants well know that the "residential nature" 
of units# 1 through# 3 are referenced in numerous places in the record, including Exhibit 5 to 
Dave Carpenter's deposition and in the planning & zoning documents provided as part of Exhibit 
4 to Mr. Olsen's affidavit, and their own discovery responses attached as Exhibit 5 (See 
December 5, 2013, from Don Carey letter and exhibit.) Further, Defendants are fully aware of 
the recent deposition that it took of the prior owner Rod Furniss (not yet a part of the record) 
wherein, again, the residential nature of the units are further confirmed. Simply put, the 
"residential status" of all of the Sunnyside units have never been disputed by defendants. 
1 Of further note, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was hand delivered to Plaintiff's attorney late 
on Friday January 31 5 \ exactly 28 days before the hearing. Defendants then scheduled four depositions 
during the week that Plaintiff's response was due. Defendants' essentially left Plaintiff's very little time to 
pinpoint each and every disputed fact in their fact-heavy motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, 
Plaintiff has provided a number of disputed facts that warrant denial of Defendants' motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE- 2 
we agreed to that sitting at his 
desk" when Mr. Long "brought in" the documents. Troy Carpenter Dep. 32: 18: 19-25, 32, 34: 
11-16. This suggests that the event took place after the purchase and when Path had moved into 
the property. At worst, the creates some ambiguity as to when the document was signed and 
back dated. Again, all that Defendants have done is to confirm that there are material issues of 
fact for trial. 
5. Statements made to the Carpenters with regard to the zoning of the property are 
allowed under a number of exceptions to the Hearsay rule, including IRE§ 803(1 ), (3), ( 4), (6), 
(8), (20), (21), and/or (24). Moreover, representations made to the Carpenters by the City 
resulted in certain impressions or concerns by Carpenters about the future status of the zoning on 
the property. Thus, such statements are not being asserted for to "prove the truth of the matter 
asserted" and are therefore not "Hearsay" as defined under IRE§ 801(c). In addition, such 
information was critical in the formation of Path's opinions, which are allowed under IRE 701 
and 704. 
6. All of the planning & zoning records are without question permissible under IRE§§ 
803(6)(7)(8)(10)(15)(24) and 901,902. Any suggestion that the City's Planning & Zoning 
Council does not affect the City's decisions with regard to the zoning of properties is patently 
absurd, regardless of whether it is the City Council which makes the ultimate decision. By rule, a 
permit application must go before the zoning council for discussion and recommendations before 
it even is considered by the Council. Finally, Defendants provide no authority whatsoever 
requiring a showing that the meeting minutes were ultimately "approved" in order to be admitted. 
Presumably, the minutes were approved and/or amended accordingly or they would not be in the 
record. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE- 3 
7. #5 concerns 
are 
opinions to Path about the ability to obtain future conditional use permits on the property. 
8. Again, Defendants provide no authority to suggest that Path cannot at least partially 
rely on its allegations set forth in its complaint. Nevertheless, there was a fair amount of 
discussion about the allegations in the complaint pe11aining to mediation during Dave Carpen-
ter's deposition. (Dave Carpenter Dep. pp. 105-109) 
9. Defendants have provided no authority whatsoever to suggest that an assignment of 
claims, as alleged in a complaint, cannot be relied upon to refute the legal arguments in a 
summary judgment motion. In any case, Dave Carpenter affirmed such assignn1ent in his 
deposition. (Dave Carpenter 84: 1-5.) IRE 1005 does not prevent a witness from orally indicat-
ing that there was an assignment of claims. Regardless, the signed assignment has been provided 
to Defendants upon their request, now making the entire issue moot. 
10. Mr. Cannon's testimony clearly suggests that at no point did Mr. Long disclose to 
him the nature of the zoning of the property. Mr. Cannon indicates that he did not become aware 
of the zoning until he received a letter from Path well after the transaction. (Cannon Dep. 16: 13-
25.) Moreover, Mr. Long himself admits in an e-mail to Mr. Cannon that he had never disclosed 
the zoning to Cannon. (See paragraph 4 of Dec. 13, 2011, e-mail from Long to Cannon, Ex. 3 to 
Cannon Dep.) The Defendants are in fact "deliberately misstating" the record, not Path. 
11. As Defendants well know, and what is clearly identified in the record, The December 
2010 agreement that Mr. Cannon testified that he had signed at a Barnes & Noble in Idaho Falls 
has never been produced. 
12. The fact that Defendants did not obtain a "Property Condition Disclosure Statement" 
which would have provided indication that this was a residential property is most certainly 
relevant. As noted in Path's response its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants had 
statutory duties to "exercise reasonable skill and care" and to "disclose all adverse material facts 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE lN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE- 4 3 
at 1 
were to perform to the 
and seller. (Id.) Such duties would have required the Defendants to ascertain whether a "Property 
Condition Disclosure Statement" which is required by law for ever; residential property sale -
was necessary in this transaction. This would have therefore required Defendants to check the 
zoning status of the property to determine whether such a disclosure was necessary. Defendants 
failure as such is relevant. 
13. This objection is purely legal argument having nothing to do with the admissibility of 
the evidence. Again, the preparation of a listing agreement and MLS sheet would have required 
Defendants to ascertain the zoning of the property. 
14. Again, nothing prohibits Path from relying on the allegations in its complaint as part 
of its response to the Summary Judgment. Regardless, the actual amount that Cannons received 
in payments from Path is immaterial for summary judgment purposes. All that is material at this 
juncture is that Cannons did receive payments from Path. 
15. The statement with regard to the relationship between Long and Furniss is not 
hearsay because it is based on the Carpenters own observations. In any case, Defendants well 
know that Mr. Furniss confirmed such relationship in his deposition. 
16. The listing of a condominium unit that shares the same walls and owner of the 
subject property is most certainly relevant. 
17. See response to# 4. There is absolutely no question that when these documents were 
signed and under what circumstances are disputed facts that can only be resolved by a jury. 
18. See response to# 4 and# 17. 
19. Defendants are again incorrect. Defendants admitted in paragraph 6 their "Answer" 
that the "language was added to the form contract by Long." That Long did not review the 
contract language with Path is consistent with the testimony provided. See again response to# 4. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE- 5 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 27th day of February, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class. mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b ), LR.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Donald F. Carey, Esq. 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Dr, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-13 88 
FAX: (208) 529-0005 
EMAIL: dfcarey@carevperkins.com 
Method of Service: 
( ) mail ( ) hand ( x ) fax ( ) email 
Counsel for Defendants Daren Long, All-In 
Inc., db Re/Max All-In Realtors 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE- 6 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
ISB # 7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP 
ft\ . i"'t· 
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Case No. CV-201 195 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL 
MATERIAL FACTS IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Per the Court's prior instruction and order, Plaintiff hereby provides the attached portions 
of deposition transcripts containing additional material facts in opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The transcripts do not yet include the deposition of Daren Long, which 
had been initially set for February 18, 2014, and (as indicated during the February 28, 2014, 
hearing) was reset for March 12, 2014 because of the sudden illness of Plaintiffs counsel. 
Plaintiff anticipates a number of additional material facts from Mr. Long's testimony, which will 
be immediately provided to the Court upon the receipt of a rush order of the transcript. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 r:J 
v 
and 
1. Dr. Karie Jonak. Dr. Jonak's testimony further corroborates Dave Carpenter and other's 
testimony about representations made to Path by Mr. Long with regard to the zoning of the 
property. At one point she accompanied Troy Carpenter and Daren Long in searching for 
properties where she and Path could operate their respective businesses. Jonak Dep. 18:4-25, 19. 
One of the properties included the subject property in the lawsuit. Id. In a discussion about the 
parking, Daren Long made specific indications that he was aware of the "zoning" on the 
property. Id. 20, 21: 1. There were also additional discussions with regard to whether the property 
was "commercially zoned" wherein Mr. Long represented that the property was "zoned for what 
you guys need." Id. 21 :2-24. 
2. Carla Elliot. Ms. Elliot's testimony further corroborates Dave Carpenter and other's 
testimony about representations made to Path by Mr. Long with regard to the zoning of the 
property. She is a former employee of Path who was present during a "walk through" of the 
property with Mr. Long and the Carpenters. Elliot Dep. 21:11-25, 22-23. Ms. Elliot recalled the 
discussion that "(the property) would be a great location, that even though the parkmg lot was 
small and it was kind of designed as a condo, it was still commercially rated, and it would be 
great." Id. 21 :20-25. She also recalled further discussion between individuals there and Daren 
Long that: "See how nice this beautiful office is. It's commercially rated, and so that won't be a 
problem for us." Id. 23: 11-17. 
,., 
.) . Mr. Furniss's testimony is relevant for a number of reasons. Mr. Furniss at one 
point owned all four of the condominium units. Furniss Dep. 37: 13-18. Mr. Long represented 
him has his realtor for the residential unit# 3. 37:1-20, Ex. 1., 40:15-25, 41:1-12. Mr. Furniss 
confirmed his long time friendship and association with Daren Long. Id. 21:22-25, 22:1-3, 33:8-
1 Mr. Furniss had a conversation with Mr. Long about the Cannon/Path to Health transaction 
wherem Mr. Long said: 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS JN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2 
Id. 22:1, 23·1-14. 1 
From this statement, the trier of fact can potentially presume that 1) Mr. Long was aware of the 
need for a conditional use permit (despite statements in the record to the contrary) and 2) that he 
had "disclosed" that to Path ( again despite statements in the record to the contrary. )2 
Mr. Furniss testified that he had referred Mr. Long to Cannons to serve as their realtor. 
Id. 34:7-25. Mr. Furniss then indicated that "Daren came over to the office or had me go with 
him to the office and show him around." Id. 35:1-5. (He then tried to walk this statement back, 
again raising a disputed fact to be resolved by the jury. Id. 35:5-25, 36: 1-4.) 
Mr. Furniss also stated that "when anybody ever talks to me about that building, I talk to 
them about the Conditional Use Permit." Id. 10:12-14. Again, this lends further support to the 
presumption that when Mr. Furniss discussed the property with his "good friend" Daren Long 
(with him he had also listed Unit# 3), that he told Mr. Long about the need for a Conditional Use 
Permit on the property. 
Mr. Furniss also claims he had "disclosed" to Cannons about the need for a Conditional 
Use Permit for the property. Id. 9:21-25, 10:1-15. This of course is in direct contradiction to Mr. 
Cannon's testimony and statements on the record. (Cannon Dep. 23:4-23, 24, Ex. 3.) Again, this 
is a refuted fact that should be considered by the jury. 
1 At several points during his deposition, Mr. Furniss would make a statement, and then 
attempt to "walk it back" by then claiming he didn't recall or suggesting something different. 
See for example in this instance page 23: 15-21. This is conflicting testimony that is appropriate 
for resolution by the jury. 
These statements are admissible as admissions, one of the exceptions to hearsay. 
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the International Institute of Massage Therapy. 
And the three of you share that 
suite? 
A. It's the whole nrr'1"1Prtu So don't 
know know that nrC\T'>PrT\1 It's the old Hatch 
6 mansion, and it's 1.75 acres. 
7 MR. OLSEN: It's on 1st Street, right? 
s THE WITNESS: Yep. Behind WinCo. 
9 MR. CAREY: I'm not familiar with it. 
1o MR. OLSEN: It's kind of an old looking 
11 mansion. 
12 THE WITNESS: There used to be a spa in there 
for a lot of years, and now it's a health center and 
14 massage therapy school. 
15 Q. (BY MR. CAREY) Okay. So there are two 
16 doctors in there practicing --
17 A. Just myself. I'm the only doctor. We 
18 have the colon hydrotherapist, we have the massage 
19 therapy school, and we have an acupuncturist, and 



























Q. Okay. Are they your employees? 
A. No. 




Q. Okay. Same kind of an arrangement, if 
Page 18 
you bring in a patient, that goes under your ledger, 
you take care of your own taxes? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. Okay. Did you participate in the 
property search when the property over on Rollandet 
was looked at, you and Troy? 
A. Y eab, uh-huh. 
Q. What do you recall of that property? 
A. It was just another property that Daren 
had shown us. I think we had seen a dozen at that 
point. One of the calculating factors is they wanted 
to buy something, Troy and Dave. It didn't need a 
whole lot of work to move into. 
Q. When you say it needed a whole lot of 
work, what do you --
A. Well, a lot of the properties we were 
looking at needed work. You know, as far as like, 
again, for something that I could use for the colon 
hydrotherapy machine. A lot of times there was no 
space. You have to have a fairly significant-sized 
room because the machine itself is like the size of a 
22 bed, so it's -- you have to have a decent-sized room, 
23 bathroom, plumbing to be able to utilize that. 
/ :: for me; ou need a couple of offices, obviously, 
~-him. We wanted classroom space, that kind 
1 of stuff. So those were some of the criteria I 
2 remember at the time. 
So when you say it needed a lot of work 
to move are you that it would have 
needed a lot ofwo:rk to move into two went in 
6 there together as opposed to if he was able to occupy 
7 the space separately? 
B A. Not really. What I mean -- I'm talking 
9 about the other -- I know they picked that one 
10 because they didn't have to work as hard on the 
11 actual dwelling itself for that piece of property as 
12 far as it didn't need more than paint. 
13 I mean, we didn't have to delineate too 
14 many extra rooms. We didn't have to put walls up. 
15 We didn't have to do all of that kind of stuff. 
16 As far as the colon hydrotherapy 
1 7 machine, it did not work out. You know, I could not 
18 put that in there. The other thing I remember was 
19 the parking. We didn't really care for the parking. 
20 And ifl remember correctly, they told us that we 
21 could fix the parking, that we could add to the 
22 parking, that was part of the reason that we were 
23 looking at that particular space. 
24 Q. When you say they told us we could, who 























Q. Do you recall specifically what he said 
about the parking? 
Page 20 
A. That because of the zoning, we should be 
able to move some of the stuff. Instead of having 
two cars -- you know, two spaces there, that we 
should have about six. And that there was also, of 
course, we could put our cars in the garage and stuff 
like that, which, you know, it was a huge problem 
automatically,just the parking, because of the fact 
-- and that's why we asked specifically on that one. 
There's six ofus. You've got Carla, 
Tina, Dave, Troy, and myself. So I guess that's 
five. But at any given moment now you've got five --
three of our vehicles are big. You know, those two 
have big old trucks, I've got a Suburban, the girls 
have small cars. 
You can get the two small cars in the ,20 
21 garage, but, you know, now we've got three other big 
22 cars. So that was one of the factors. 
23 That's one of the reasons we left the 
2 4 downtown thing too is the parking was ridiculous. , 
2 5 parking was a big deal to us. And Daren said that we 
17- 0 1 
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l would be able to add to it. 
2 
3 and 
its use as an office? 
s A. had to be zoned 
6 because, especially with what I do, I have to have 
7 commercial property. 
s Q. Okay. 
9 A. With anythlng like a -- the machinery 
10 that I use in my business, I have to have proper 
i 11 zoning no matter what. 
12 Q. What is proper zoning? 
13 A. It's commercial property zoning as far 
14 as I -- I mean, I couldn't tell you what that means. 
15 I couldn't give you a definition right now, but I 
16 could look it up for you and know exactly what it 
17 was. 
18 Q. Okay. All right. Do you recall Daren 
19 saying anything at all about the zoning specifically? 
2 o A. Yeah, we asked specifically. 
21 Q. What did he say? 
22 A. He said, "It's zoned." 
23 Q. For? 
2 4 A. "For what you guys need." 
25 Q. Okay. And at the time you were looking 
Page 22 
1 for office space, correct, to run your practice? 
2 A. Commercially-zoned office space, yes. 
3 Q. Here is what I want to ask you: And 
4 this is a point of contention in this case. Did 
5 Daren say, "This is zoned commercial," in those 
6 words? 
7 A. I do not recall that. 
B Q. Okay. All right. At some point you 
9 made the decision not to buy in to the purchase of 
10 that suite, correct? 
11 A. Uh-huh. 
12 Q. Is that a yes? 
13 A. Yes. Sorry. 
14 Q. Where did you go at that point? 
15 A. My property was over on 13th Street 
16 around the edge of all of that commercial zoning next 
17 to Poitevin Park. 13th Street. It's west 13th. Do 
18 you know where Bott Yamaha is over there? 
19 Q. I do. 
20 A. Okay. So right around in that comer 
21 there, that's all commercially zoned, and we were-· 
22 it can be used as a house, and it can be used a 
23 commercial space, and we used it for an office. 
24 And we had a whole huge room for our 
25 colon hydrotherapy there, perfect plumbing, the whole 
1 bit. So it worked out perfect for us. And it wasn't 
2 about We didn't have -- that wasn't a big 
3 or anythlng, and we had of parking. 
4 again, it was about the and something I 
5 could put my machines in. 
6 Q. Okay. When did you decide to -- or you 
7 already told me how you decided. When did you stop 
8 practicing and paying rent to Path To Health? 
9 A. July of; was that '11? 








A. Right. It's that year. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. July of that year? 






Q. Okay. When did you vacate the Capital 
Street property? 
20 A. I want to say, I don't know why this 








Q. Of July? 
A. Yeah. 
1 Q. Okay. 
2 A. Because -- and I think I moved out two 
Page 24 
3 weeks before they did because I remember going back 
4 and cleaning up my little space, painting, and all of 
5 that stuff, and they were moving out, cleaning 
6 carpets at the same time. 
7 So essentially within the two-week 
8 period of when they did, but I did it first. 
9 Q. So you left, you think, the last day was 
10 July 17th, and you think that the Carpenters left 
11 about two weeks later? 
12 A. Yeah, probably the end of the month, I 






Q. All right. And you moved straight in to 
1 7 the property over by Bott Yamaha, and you continued 




Q. All right. And then you've since 
21 relocated your practice once again? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. I had to finally get bigger. 
25 Q. Okay. All right. Has there been any 
21 24 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. All right. Do you have any idea what 
the was of Path To Health for any of 
4 the years you were there? 
5 I have no idea. 
6 Q. All right. You were at the Capital 
7 Street location for a number of years before the 
a relocation to the Sunnyside or Boulevard office, 
9 correct? 
10 A. Correct. 
11 Q. Did you participate in the search for 
12 new offices when Path To Health was anticipating 
13 relocating its business? 
14 A. The only time that I was participating 
15 in that at all was as they found this last building, 
16 and because they were fairly sure that they wanted to 
17 go, they wanted just -- so they took all of the 
18 employees at the time over to look at the new 
19 building to see what we thought. 
20 At that time, they were discussing the 
21 fact that it would be a great location, that even 
22 though the parkmg lot was small and it was kmd of 
23 designed as a condo, it was still commercially rated, 
2 4 and it would be great. And where it was already set 
25 up, they liked the way that it was set up as an 
Page 22 
1 office building, the way it was being used. It just 
2 seemed like a good fit for the small office that --
3 because Dr. Carpenter was downsizing, with Dr. Karie 
4 not going to be moving with us, then it was just a 
5 good size. But that was the only one that I went 
6 with. 
7 Q. Let me make sure I'm understanding this. 
8 That's the building that you ultimately moved into? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. And it's on the corner ofRollandet and 
12 Sunnyside. 
13 Q. Correct. 
14 Who went on this trip to see this 
15 perspective new office space? 
16 A. I know there was myself; and Dr. 
17 Carpenter, and Troy, and Tina, and we met Daren Long 
18 there. I don't recall if Dr. Jonak went with us or 
19 not because she had been involved in a lot of the 
20 location of the buildings even though she didn't 
21 ultimately move with us. 
r22 
Q. Okay. Do you know when that trip took 
3 place in relationship to the purchase of that 
24 building by Path To Health? 
25 In other words, was it before they 
CARLA ELLIOTT 
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1 dosed on the purchase, after closed on 
2 
4 don't remember how 
5 So did you walk the 
6 office? 
7 A. Yes. 
a Q. Okay. And what did you think? 
9 A. I thought it was a beautiful office 
10 building. 
11 Q. Okay. Do you remember any conversation 
12 between anyone and Daren Long? 
13 A. I remember vaguely, as in I could not 
14 tell you who had what conversations. I remember a 
15 vague discussion as we walked through, "See how nice 
16 this beautiful office is. It's commercially rated, 
1 7 and so that won't be a problem for us." 
18 And then all ofus that were there, you 
19 know, discussing, "Well, we could move this wall. We 
20 could do this and this to make--" put so and so 
21 here. 
22 But, you know, how would we arrange 
23 people, where would we put product, things that would 
2 4 need to be done to make it up to what we would need. 
25 But I can't tell you conversation. 
1 Q. Okay. So there was some discussion 
2 about remodeling even before the close of the sale? 
3 A. Yes. Yes, because there were definitely 
4 things that needed to be fixed and -- a little bit, 
5 not a lot, because it was already a beautiful office 
6 building, but little things. 
7 I do know after they had purchased they 
8 put a whole lot into fixing the basement so it was 
9 insulated and able -- and useable for storage for 
10 stuff. They did, you know, just repairs, and 
11 painting, and lots of stuff like that. 
12 Q. When you say rated for commercial, can 
13 you be specific about the words that were used? 
14 A. I can't. 
15 Q. And who used them? 
16 A. I can't. I remember the discussion 
17 coming up, but I honestly can't remember. But I know 
18 that it came up and it was discussed, but I honestly 
19 can't remember who said it. 
20 Q. You don't know whether it was Dr. 
21 Carpenter, or Troy Carpenter, or Daren Long? 
22 A. I don't. 
23 Q. Was it you? 
24 A. I know it wasn't me. 6 
25 Q. Okay. Was it Tina? 
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~n,,h~,n,t" in my business with that building. 
3 Did you sell you:r business to him at any 
time? 4 
5 A. I sold -- my business is comprised of 











A. And he purchased a portion of the 
securities business at that time. 
Q. Okay. And you kept the other portion of 
the securities in the life and the health? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. At some point he purchased the 
building from you, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. During the negotiations leading 
up to the purchase, was there any disclosure to Mr. 
Cannon that you had been operating with a Conditional 
Use Permit? 
A. Sure. 








All right. But 
used those words at some 
~ll<L3>Ul~the UU.UUSUX~ 
A. Fairly confident. 
Q. Okay. At some point Mr. Cannon sold the 
building to Path To Health. Are you aware of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What are you aware of? 9 
10 A. Not much, really. I know that I've got 
11 it all secondhand through the realtors and from 
12 Scott, but I don't -- I hadn't seen any documents. I 









Q. Okay. You weren't involved in that 
transaction directly? 
A. Huh-uh. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What do you recall by way of information 
being provided to you either by Scott or realtors 
concerning that transaction? 
that disclosure had been made. And I mean, from you 22 A. I remember hearing a price, and that it 
23 was less than he paid me for it. I had gone over 23 to Mr. Cannon. 
24 A. I told him when he bought the building 
25 that ifwe ever moved our business -- that I was 
Page 10 
1 operating under a Conditional Use Permit in that --
2 in that business, and if we ever moved out of that 
3 building, that -- I didn't say, "me," I guess, but I 
4 said ifwe -- if I ever left that building or -- that 
5 I was operating -- I know I told him I was operating 
6 under a Conditional Use Permit, because he asked me 
7 when I -- when he bought the building. 
8 Q. Okay. And how confident are you of 
9 that? 90 percent, 95? 
10 A. Well, I don't know the day, and I don't 
11 remember the conversation, but I remember us having a 
12 conversation, and I always -- when anybody ever talks 
13 to me about that building, I talk to them about the 
14 Conditional Use Permit. So I'm fairly confident that 
15 I had talked to them about that. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. I'm not saying that he would have 
18 understood that or that he would have known what a 
·19 Conditional Use Permit is. I mean, it may have 
120 rolled off my tongue, and he would have went, "Okay," 
/21 and we went on. I don't remember ifhe -- if I -- I 
122 don't remember him acknowledging that h{ understood 
23 that. 
24 Q. Understood what a Conditional Use 
25 was, correct? 
.2 4 there to pick up some mail that had gone there, I 
























said that they were excited to be there. 
Q. That was the new tenants, Path To 
Health? 
A. Yeah. Yeah. They had done some work on 
it. 
Q. Okay. Who told you what the price was? 
A. It must have been the realtor because I 
don't remember Scott telling me, so ... 
Q. Okay. When you say you went over to 
pick up the mail that had been delivered there, do 
you recall when that was? What month, what year? 
A. I don't. It seemed like it was warm 
outside. I walked in. They were painting. That's 
about all I remember. 
Q. Okay. So there were people there 
actually painting the interior walls of the suite --
A. Uh-huh. 




Q. All right Did you have any other 
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No. 
Have you talked to Dave 
of this uuu~•=;.. 
about 
Have you talked to Mr. 
6 Carpenter's son, about Path To Health's purchase of 
7 this building? 
8 A. I had a conversation with Mr. Carpenter, 
9 with Troy, after they had purchased the building, but 
10 I was asking them if they would like to purchase the 
11 condo next door. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. And that's the only conversation I had 
14 with them. 
15 Q. Did you ever have a conversation with 
16 him at any time about his application for a 
17 Conditional Use Permit? 
18 A. Not that I recall. 
19 Q. Okay. I want to direct your attention 
20 back to Daren Long. Do you know Daren? 
21 A. I do. 
22 Q. How do you know Daren? 
23 A. Well, I've probably known Daren for 
24 20 years. I first met hlm playing basketball, 
25 morning church basketball. I may have known him 
Page 22 
1 before that even. but, you know, I've known him a 
2 long time. I've sold rum life insurance at one 
3 point. 
4 Q. Have you ever used him as a realtor? 
5 A. I buy and sell a lot of property. I 
6 don't recall ever using hlm, but if I did, it would 
7 just slip my mind. I don't recall ever using rum. 
B Q. Okay. You knew him playing basketball 
9 years ago, do you still socialize with him in any 
10 regard? 
11 A. Socialize, like go to dinner, no. But 
12 we call each other once in a while, and I see how 
13 he's doing. You know, he's went through some hard 
14 times. I would call rum and see how he's doing. 
15 Q. Okay. So you know of him, and do you 
16 consider him a friend? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. All right. Hav~ you ever heard anyone 
19 assert that Daren was ~ishonest in any of his 
" 20 business dealings? 
21 A. Never. 
22 Q. Okay. Do you know if be has a 
23 reputation for being honest and 
2 4 A. He does. 
25 Q. Okay. Have you had a specific 
'ROD FURNISS 
1 conversation with him about the transaction between 
Cannons and Path To Health? 
3 A. Yeah. He's told me -- he's told me the 
5 What has he told 
6 A. That there was a discrepancy about 
7 whether they knew about the Conditional Use Permit or 
8 not and whether he disclosed it to them or not. He 
9 felt like he had disclosed it or that he told them 
10 what he knew. 
1.1 Q. Did he tell you what he toid them? 
12 And by "them," I'm assuming it's Path To 
13 Health, am I correct? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay. Did he tell you what he told Path 
16 To Health or what he thinks he told Path To Health? 
17 A. You know, I can't remember ifhe told me 
l8 that he knew that Path To Health knew about the 
19 initial Conditional Use Permit or if he told me that 
20 Scott knew about it. I can't remember. I'm sorry. 
21 It's probably been a year ago --
22 Q. Okay. 
2 3 A. -- that we talked about that. 
24 Q. So you just don't recall what he said on 
25 point? 
Page 24 
1 A. Huh-uh. 
2 Q. No? Is that a no? 
3 A. That's a no. Sorry. 
4 Q. Okay. Have you talked to Scott about --
5 I know when this dustup happened there was a letter 
6 written by Path To Health to Scott Cannon. Did Scott 
7 get ahold of you after he received that letter, if 
B you know? 
9 A. It seems like there was a phone call 
10 that Scott made to me right in the begincing of that 
11 problem, and asked me about the Conditional Use 
12 Permit and how it worked, and ... 
13 Q. Did he acknowledge at that time in that 
14 initial phone call that he had been aware that there 
15 was a Conditional Use Permit, or did he suggest that 
16 he didn't know about the Conditional Use Permit 
1 7 either way? 
18 A. I don't recall. I just remember talking 
19 to him at the very onset of that After that, I 
;20 don't remember getting any phone calls from Scott, 
21 and then we kind of became competitors after that, 
22 and so he didn't call me. 
Q. Competitors in a business sense? 
A. Yeah. 
367 
Q. Okay. Do you know anything more about 
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~-.. ~~= from you, do if he went and 
obtained a Conditional Use Permit? 
He did not, that I but I'm not 
he needed to because still in the 
5 The -- from my the 
6 permit went with me, not with the owner of the 
7 building. 
8 Q. All right. Now, you mentioned that 
9 you've had, more or less, a life-long relationship 
10 with Daren Long, and, what, you said it's been going 
11 on about 20 years? 
12 A A long time. 
13 Q. How old were you when you first got to 
14 know Daren? 
15 A Probably in my 30s, 30 to 35. His 
16 brother invited me out to play basketball, and I 
1 7 played basketball out there with them for several 
18 years. 
19 Q. When you say, "out there" --
20 A Iona. 
21 Q. - did you go play like at a church 
2 2 building? 
23 A Uh-huh. 
24 Q. Church basketball? 








Q. That's a yes? 
A. Yes. Sorry. 
Q. How often do you see Mr. Long? 
A. Oh, once a quarter maybe. 
Q. Once every three months? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Let's talk about at the time that this 
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B transaction was going on with Mr. Cannon, how often 
9 did you see Mr. Long? 
10 A Not very often at all. I referred Daren 
11 Long to Mr. Cannon, and the only reason I did, I h,id 
12 just talked to Daren because I think he was going 
13 through a divorce, and I had heard about it, and I 
14 called him, and then actually Scott asked me to -- he 
15 asked me for a recommendation on a realtor, and I 
16 gave him Daren Long, and that's how they hooked up. 
1 7 Q. So did you call Daren and let him know 
18 that be had a potential client, Mr. Cannon? 
19 A No. I just gave his name and number to 
2 o Scott, and I think he took it from there. 
21 Q. Did you have any conversations at all 
with Daren about Mr. Cannon wanting to sell that 
property? 
2 4 A I think Daren called me after Scott had 
2 5 called hlm and said, "Thanks for the referral." 
1 Q. Did you have any -- did he have any 
2 questions about the building? 
A I think Daren came over to the 
office or had me go with him to the office and show 
hlm around once. It seems like I talked to Daren at 
6 the -- Daren came by my office from time to t'irne 
7 because he was a life insurance client, so I can't 
8 remember if I talked to hlm. 
9 I don't recall if it was -- it seems 
10 like I was still working there, so it must not have 
-- I must not have talked to hlm in the building 
12 after, so I would say no to that. I don't think I 
1:3 went with Daren to the building after I moved out 
u Q. I kind of got some different answers 
1.5 there~ Maybe --
16 A. Yeah. 
1 7 Q. Let me try to pinpoint the time frame 
18 I'm talking about. So you had mentioned that Mr. 
19 Long, or Daren, had called you after you referred Mr. 
20 Cannon to him. And what can you recall about that 
21 conversation? 
22 A. I don't really recall anything other 
2 3 than I remember him thanking me for the referral. 
2 4 Q. And then you said he came over to your 
2.5 office at some point after that? 
1 A. No, I can't--
2 backtracked. I'm not sure if it was after that. I 
3 don't think it was. I don't think I went with him to 
4 that office while it was empty. 
5 Q. So do you recall any conversations that 
6 you had with Daren about that unit? 
7 
8 
A. I've had lots of conversations with hlm 
about that unit. I just don't know if I recall the 
9 conversations I had prior to that transaction. 
10 Q. What about after the transaction? 
A. Well --11 
12 Q. And I'm talking about the Cannon --
13 well, yeah. Let's get clear on what transaction 
14 we're talking about. 
15 From the time that the Cannons obtained 
16 Daren as a realtor to the time that it was sold to 
17 Path To Health, do you recall what conversations you 
18 had with Daren Long during that period? 
A I don't. I didn't really -- I wasn't 19 
20 involved with that transaction other than making the 
21 referral. I didn't know that -- I didn't know the 
22 price until long after it was done. 
23 Q. Now, you mentioned --
24 · A. I don't remember Path To Health even 
25 calling me, so ... 
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MR. OLSEN: You earlier that you 
couldn't recall whether you had ever retained Daren 
as a realtor. With that in I would like 
hand you Exhibit I guess we'll mark 
as Exhibit- I. 
6 (EXHIBIT-1 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATIO:N) 
7 THE WITNESS: Oh, yeah. 
s Q. (BY MR. OLSEN) All right. And I'll 
9 represent to you that this is a listing off of the 
10 MIS with regard to 480 West Sunnyside Road in this 
11 case, which is Unit 3. 
12 A. Yep. 
13 Q. Now, before I ask you about this, what 
14 can you tell me about this condominium complex that 
15 this unit and also Unit 4 is part of? 
16 A. There's four units in this condo, and 
1 7 I've owned all four of those units. And I've sold --
18 I think I've sold this particular unit three, or 
19 four, or five times. And I had forgotten that Daren 
20 represented me on one of these sales. 
21 Q. You say you had sold it three, or four, 
22 or five times. 
23 A. Yeah. Yeah. People would come in-- I 
2 4 owned it outright so I could finance it, they would 
2 5 buy it for a while, and then they wanted to move, and 
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1 they would ask me if they could -- they wanted to 
2 give it back to me, and I would take it back,, and 
3 then I would resell it, and I would rent and .J I had 
4 forgotten that I had asked Daren to list this unit. 
5 Q. Do you know if he ever sold it? 
6 A. I can't remember ifhe ever sold it or 
7 not, or if I sold it and he didn't sell it. 
8 Q. So why did people keep coming back and 
9 wanting to resell you this property after you got it? 
10 MR. CAREY: Object to form. Calls for 
11 speculation on what they might be thinking. 
12 Go ahead. 
13 THE WITNESS: This is a great property. I 
14 had no problem selling this property, and people that 
15 -- I think I got it back two or three times, that I 
16 can recall, and they just -- when they would tell me 
17 they were going to sell it, I would say, "Well, if 
18 you want, I'll buy it back from you for what you owe 
19 on it," and they agreed. 
Q. (BY MR. OLSEN) Well, when did you first 
21 own Unit 3, this one that we're referring to in 
22 Exhibit-!? 
23 A. I don't recall. I bought those units at 
2 4 a little bit -- I bought the unit that I put my 
business in first, and then I ended up buying all of 
those but were all individual sales. And 
so I almost had to wait for the to want to 
move out or to die to them and -- but 
I owned them so I don't recall 
Did you own --
6 A. I'm sure it's on the record. 
7 Q. And I think you mentioned earlier that 
B you recall purchasing Unit 4 in about 2000? 
9 A. Yeah. I think it was either December or 
10 early or late 2000, or 1999, but by March of 2000, we 
11 were moved in and running. And I think I got my 
12 Conditional Use Permit in May or so. 
13 Q. Did you own Unit Number 3 prior to that 
14 point or after that point? 
15 A. It would have been after, I believe. 
16 Q. Did you live in any of these units at 
1 7 one point? 
1s A. No. 
19 Q. So you didn't buy them all at the same 
20 time, you said it was at various times, and at one 
21 point you owned all four? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Okay. But you don't own all four now? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Which ones do you own? 
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1 A. I own 3 and 4. I sold 1 and 2. I 
2 actually sold 1 -- or I sold number 2 a couple of 
3 times I think too. And finally David Sevy bought 1 
4 and 2, and he owns those. 
5 Q. Now, I may be wrong on this, but I--
6 because I've been out to the property, did 1 and 2 
7 get combined together as one unit at some point? 
8 A. I think they kind of broke a hole in the 
9 wall and they can walk through, but I think he uses 2 
1 o as more of a workshop. He fixes music instruments 
11 and -- but I think he can walk through to his house, 
12 so I think that's the only --
13 Q. Okay. So --
14 A. -- combination. 
Q. Oh, I'm sorry, I interrupted you there. 
Let's go back to Exhibit-1. And do you 
17 recall, now that you've had a chance to look this 
15 
16 
18 over, how Daren came to be the listing agent for this 
19 property? 
, 2:0 A. I'm sure I called him. 
21 Q. And after you called him, what happened 
22 next? 
2 3 A. He listed it. 
24 Q. Was there a point that he came over and 
25 walked through the unit? 




Is that a 
A. Yes. 
LLPvs. 
4 And what do you :recall? And did he walk 
5 the unit with you at the time? 
6 A. Number 3? 
7 Q. Yes. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And what do you recall discussing with 
10 him about Unit 3? 
11 A. It's a great unit, should sell. I can't 
12 :remember what we priced it at. 97,000. 
13 Q. Do you know if he's listed any of the 
14 other units in this condominium complex before? 
15 A. I don't remember him listing that one, 
16 so ... 
1 7 Q. So when you were discussing Unit 3, did 
18 you have any conversation with Mr. Long about the 
19 condominium complex as a whole? 
2 o A. I don't -- I don't think so. , 
21 Q. He didn't ask anything about any of the 
22 other units? 
23 A. No. We just talked about number 3, I'm 
2 4 sure. That was the only unit I wanted to sell at the 
25 time. I don't think it sold. I don't think he sold 
1 it. I think I ended up renting it, and I pulled the 
2 listing. 
3 Q. So at this point it's not sold. Are you 
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4 renting it now, or what's the status of Unit Number 
5 3? 
6 A. It's under contract to be sold on the 
7 20th of February. It will close on the 20th of 
8 February. 
9 Q. And who is that with? 
10 MR. CAREY: The same property--
11 THE WITNESS: That Steve Howe. 
12 M:R. OLSEN: Oh, that's right. Okay. Now 
13 we've come full circle here. So this is being sold 
14 as part of the unit for sale. I apologize for that. 
15 Q. (BY MR. OLSEN) Now that you've had a 
16 chance to think about whether Mr. Long has listed 
1 7 properties with you before, are there any other 
18 properties that you can think of now, other than Unit 
19 Number3? 
20 A. You know, I probably own 50 properties. 
21 We've talked about having him listing some property I 
22 have up in Rexburg. I don't think we have. We 
23 talked about listing a lot of properties. I don't 
24 remember -- oh, you know, I might have signed a 
25 contract to have him list some lots that I own, but I 
1 think that was informal. I don't 
2 signed the paperwork for that. 
3 He's always trying to get me to sell 
4 to him -- I mean, you to list 
5 But I don't recall 
6 M:R. OLSEN: All right. Let's mark another 
7 exhibit here, 2. 
8 (EXHIBIT-2 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 
9 Q. (BY MR. OLSEN) And I'll just represent 
10 to you that this is part of a file that we pulled 
l1 from the City with regard to your 2000 permit 
12 process. 
13 A. Okay. 
14 Q. So these are all --
15 A. So I was on the right year. 
16 Q. So I just want to walk through this a 
l 7 little bit with you, and I've got this exhibit Bates 
18 stamped by page so that hopefully we can keep track 
19 of it on the record. 
20 But if we look at this first page, so 
21 this is Bates number 1, there is a timeline for a 
22 Conditional Use Permit, and this, again, was 
23 contained within the City records. 
24 If you could just take a minute and look 
25 over this and tell me if you remember anything 
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1 different than what was indicated in this timeline. 
2 A. It's sooner than I thought. I thought I 
3 didn't -- I thought I wasn't able to open the doors 
4 until May, and I think I wasn't. I think there is 
s probably more to this. 
6 After this was scheduled, I think I got 
7 -- I think they didn't have this meeting on the 9th, 
8 and I think I got pushed another month out before 
9 they approved it. 
10 Q. Okay. And we'll go over this. There is 
11 some more information here, and we'll go over it with 
12 you. 
13 A. This looks, yeah, right. 
14 Q. It looks like, though, that there is a 
15 reference to a meeting on February 8th of 2000 from 
16 the Planning Commission. And do you recall that 
17 meeting? 
18 A. I was there. 
19 Q. And the summary of that meeting, is it 
20 anything different than what you recall? 
21 MR. CAREY: I object to the form. 
22 THE WITNESS: No. 
23 Q. (BY MR. OLSEN) All right. Then we move 
on to something that was logged in on February 23rd I 
of 2000. Actually, let's go to February 22nd of 2000 d 
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12/ 05 /201 3 THU 8: 12 FAX 
IZ] 0 0 3 /003 
12/4/13 Na.lea M l..S 
M LS #: RN174994X (Expired) List Pr ice: $97,000 480 W Sunnyside Road IDN-1 0 FALLS, ID 83402 
S TYLE: 1 Story 
TOTAL BEDROOMS: 3 
TOTAL FULL BATHS : 2 
APX YEAR BUIL T: 1973 
APX TOTAL SQFT: 1620 
TOTAL BA THS : 2 
UNIT # : 3 
COUNTY; Bo nnevil l e . .. .. . . . . . . . . . 
SUBDIVISION: GUSTA FSON PARK 
E LEMENTARY SCHOOL LONGFELLOW 
91 EL 
M IDDLE SCHOOL: EAGLE ROCK 91JH 
GA RAGE # STALLS/TYPE: 2 ~;ta li s. A ttached · HIGH SCHOOL: SKYLINE 91 HS 
ZONING-SPECIFIC: IF-RESIDENT IAL 2 
LEGAL D £ SCRIPTl0N: Unit #4 80-3, L ayton Condomi nium, Block 1 , G u stafs::m Park # 3 Amme nded 2 
APX ACREAGE: 0.0544 FLOOD PLAIN: N 
CVNTS: Yes TOP O: Comer L o t S PTCFEE: 
LOCA TTON: Interstate E xi UAccess, Near Mal I/S hop , Near Park, Near Si te B us Sto p 
PRCL # : RPA8440000480C TAXES: 948.76 TAX YR: 20 10 CBEXMPT: N 
TAX STAT US: Not Exempt 
HOA: N..°. __ ·-·· ..... . _ ·-- ._,HOA PAID: 
:.: S.;1 F't: #Bdrm s: 
Upper:_.. ' o to 
Mai n: : 11 7 0 :z 
L ow er: :0 :o 
B::mnt: -450 ·o 
ABV GRADE SQFT: 11 7 0 
HANDICAP ACCESS: No 
CONSTRUCTION/STA TUS: Brick 
EXTERIOR-PRIMARY: Bri ck 






HEAT SOURCE:ITYPE: Ga s. Forced A ir .. . . .. . . ·-
AIR CONDITIONING: None 
F OUNDATION: Concrete 
.ROOF: Compositi o n 
IIVATEf.<: .ci ~yr Pu b!.i c Wa ter 
.SEV\IER: City se.we r 
IRRIGATION: None 





PROVIDER/OTHER INFO: Idaho Fal ls Power 
BASEMENT: Unfin ished 
OTHER ROOM S: None 






A S SOCIATION FEE INCLUDES: None 
HOA FEE AM OUNT: 
#Fam: # Lvg: #Ki t: '#Frml_Dr., 5,1 : 
. Q 0 0 0 
1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
,#Oen/Ofc: # Ln dry: · #FrpJ c~ .. 
:o 0 0 
:o 1 
a 0 a 
: 0 a a 
BLW GRADE SQFT: 450 % BASEMENT FIN: 0 
LAUNDRY: Main l eve l 
APPLIANCES IN CLUDE D: Disiwash er. Rang e/Oven-Ele ctric, 
Refrige rator 
FIREPLA CE: 1 
INTERIO R FE.ATUR{s: Ceiii ng Fan(s). Garage Door Opener(s) 
EXTERIOR FEATURES: 
PATIO/DECK: Enclosed Patio . . . . . 
F£NCE TYPE/INFO: Block 
LANDSCAPING: Esiabi lsh e~ Lawn, Sprin l<Jer-Auto 
VIEW· None . . . . .. ... . . 
DRIVEWAY TYPE: A~ha!t 
•--·=""""'• ~~ ~ 4.. --~--..,~ ... . , •. , .• ,,.,. .. ,....,,...,.,..,.,.<..,.._,.....,-.,--...,..~-·-- -··-·- •·- • ............ , ... ..,..., ,.,.,..,.,,.. .• ,. _______ ,, -··- • ,,.,, .,, ,..,.., ,. ,.., ,....,.,...., .... "'·· '·· ·~-..: . ::~ ::: i-: ,-, 1:i-•- .., ,..,........, ,. ······--r ···= · - r--- .. ,._.. .. ,, ... . : . .. .... 1~:,:,: ... · : :-:: ·:..., , ·.,·,:-. : . ,i:u.:.:, , .. ""::.-~.::~ r: ::< 
EXCLUSIONS: Non e 
PUBLJC INF07 M a~ve pri c~ ,;,du ; tio n . S~p~r convenient location o n th e NE Com er of S unnysi de a nd Roll~ nd et E.asy access. spa ci ou s room s 
© 2013 S)6lems Engineering, Inc, - Al l Rights Reser.ed 
Information Herein Deemed Reliable but Not Guaranleed 
wv.na\icamls.nel/displays/?n=359&i=53348S3&k=Ai4aF 1/1 
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don't know where they are at 
2 So I\1r. Furniss introduces you to 
3 correct? 
4 A That's right 
5 Q. Then tell me when that introduction took 
6 place, if you recall. 
7 A. I recall calling Daren, and that's the 
8 first time that I talked to him. And then I think 
9 the first time we met was at the Barnes & Noble in 
10 Idaho Falls. And he knew about the building, 
11 because -- I think he was a client of Rod's so he had 
12 been in the office quite a bit. 
13 So I just told him, I just said, hey, it's 
14 my desire to sell this building. And we talked and 
15 he knew just as much about the building as I did, 
16 where it was at and how Rod operated the insurance 
17 business out of it. So I didn't have any explaining 
18 to do as far as the structure of it 
19 And then -- yeah, and then I think he got 
20 a key from our assistant there that was at the office 
21 to go in and take pictures. So he did his thing as 
22 far as posting it on his Web site. And then from 
23 there -- I believe from the get-go he said, I've got 
24 two people that I think might be candidates for this. 
25 Obviously one of them was Path To Health. That's 
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1 when he contacted them and said, hey, I've got a 
2 potential place for your business. And that's when 
3 the negotiations started as far as how to sell the 
4 building and how we did the O\vner finance deal. 
5 Q. Let me ask you, when did that initial 
6 meeting with Long occur with respect to selling this 
7 building? The transaction was inked sometime in May 
8 of 2011, so I'm looking for some date in advance of 
9 the sale date. 
10 A. When I met with Daren? 
11 Q. Yes. 
12 A I'm estimating four to six months. 
13 Q. So it would have been sometime at the 
14 latter part of 2010? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q. Do you recall signing any paperwork like a 
17 listing agreement with Daren at that time? 
18 A I did sign something in the Barnes & 
19 Noble, but I can't remember, you know, what it was. 
20 I think it was just like one of those agreements that 
21 you had to sign with the realtor that he's going to 
22 represent me. But I can't remember the specific --
23 Q. Do you have a copy of that? 
24 A I'm sure I don't. 
















































of this transaction? 





signed at the Barnes & Noble were the only documents 
I signed prior to the closing of it. That's all I 
remember. Yeah, I don't think I talked with him, or 
face-to-face, after that meeting at the Barnes & 
Noble. It was either on the phone or through e-mail 
after that. 
Q. Do you recall what the title of the 
document was? 
A I don't. 
Q. You're a financial guy. You know there's 
a lot of different titles to different documents and 
initials and dates and they are all very important. 
You can't recall what the document was? 
A I can't. I'm not really confident on this 
as far as what that is, but I believe it was just 
that Daren was going to represent me with this real 
estate sale, you know, so that's -- but I can't 
recall the exact details of what that form was. 
Q. And you think that was four to six months 
before the actual closing? 
A. Yes. That would be my best guess. 
Q. Okay. 
Page 25 
(Exhibit No. 1 marked.) 
Q. (By Mr. Carey) I'm going to hand you what 
has been marked as Exhibit 1 and ask you to take a 
look at that purchase agreement. Have you ever seen 
this document before? 
A Yes. 
Q. Can you identify what it is? 
A The Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement. 
Q. There are some initials at the bottom. Do 
you recognize either set of initials? 
A. Yes, that's mine. 
Q. Okay. On the next page --
MR OLSEN: When you say mine, it's on the 
seller's initials? 
A. Yes, the seller's initials. 
Q. (By Mr. Carey) And you pulled the exhibit 
sticker off on page 1 in order to see that, right? 
A. Yes. That's why I hesitated. 
Q. On page 2 there's another series of 
initials at the bottom. Do you recognize either of 
those? 
A Yes. That one is mine on the seller's. 
Q. Page 3? 










7 (Pages 22 to 25) I 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Sharon Morgan 
so -32s-11ss I 
From: Daren Long 
Date: Tuesday, December 13, 2011 
Subject: Path to Health 
To: Scott Cannon <cannon.scott(a),gmail.com> 
The questions wouldnt have come up now except for the city advised them 
that they could be forced to vacate if their permit was not approved. 
By rights, Rod should have informed you of the status because it could 
have easily happened to you as well. As you mention, you as the buyer 
could/should have searched the zoning yourself. As they say, ignorance is 
no defense. To be fair, they could have looked it up also, I could have, 
and you could haved. I did include in the language of the purchase 
agreement, that they had reviewed the zoning. 
Not sure if you are suggesting that you wanted me involved for this issue 
and that I have the liability. I hope thats not what you are saying. I 
think the buyer assumed, just like you did, that they could continue a 
similar use and not be in jeopardy of being kicked out. 
Lets take a look at what would have happened if we HAD known and 
disclosed. You would have had to do all of the steps that they are doing 
and bear all the costs yourself unless you could get some relief from Rod. 
The price wouldnt have increased since we were already selling on that 
basis. You would likely have had to wait to sell until all the hearings 
were over and it would be very likely that your price would have gone down 
further. As I do not believe they are seeking full reimbursement from 
you, it could be assumed that you ultimately are better off, although it 
is an unfortunate situation for all concerned. 
Similarly, I am not saying that the issue couldnt have been brought to 
light earlier had I searched the zoning to see if you were operating 
illegally, which you were. I made the mistake of assuming. I dont 
discount that I could have done that but from a financial standpoint it 
wouldnt have saved you any money. The worst case would have been if you 
ended up back to a residential zoning with an office layout. I believe 
their use and contacts with the zoning board helped them secure their own 
conditional use permit 
I agree with you that its not fair that you be held fully responsible, 
especially since their was not intent on the part of any of the parties, 
1 
> when I bought the building it did not even cross my mind about the 
> building 
> permits. I just assumed that was okay since he's been there for about 10 
> years. are they going to be kicked out of the building ? I want to be 
> fair 
> I feel bad but I just don't see how I'm held responsible for this when I 
> haven't even talked to them my whole life . that is why I wanted you to 
>be 
>apart of this to help me out with things like this and avoid something 
> like this happening. why are these questions corning up now instead of when 
> they were looking to buy the building ? 




>> Troy was in contact with me and I left you one message but havent called 
>> back since. 
>> 
>> Can you please scan and email me a copy of their letter. I believe that 
>> the issue is that we werent away that, according to the city, that you 
>> were operating there illegally and that they couldnt open with a 
>> similar 
>> use without applying for their own conditional use permit. It has been 
>>an 
>> expense and a hassle to them that they likely would have factored into 
>>the 
> > purchase if they had known. 
>> 
>> Ultimately, I think that their feeling is that perhaps it wasnt 
> > represented property to you by your seller and that you were just 
>> fortunate that the city was not made aware of the change of ownership. 
>>As 
>> they cannot seek some settlement with Rod, they have to start with you. 
>> 
>> What was your understanding of the use and the permit? I also wish I 
>> didnt have to deal with this but I would like to see it resolved to the 
>> satisfaction of all parties and I dont want to just wash my hands of it. 
>> I think that it has been a good location and building for them, but the 
>> city has been difficult to work with and the costs were unexpected. 
>> 











>> > rpr,·,:;rn 
>> building. 
>> > I really don't want to deal with this and hope you can resolve the 
>>>problem. I thought the zoning was fully disclosed and that zoning is 







>>>Scott Cannon, CFP® 
>> > 1412 S Legend Hills Dr. Ste. 230 







Scott Cannon, CFP® 
1412 S Legend Hills Dr. Ste. 230 




View Drive, Suite B 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-2913 
Telephone: (208) 529-0000 
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Attorneys for Defendants Daren Long and Re/Max All-In Realtors 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife; DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALTORS, a real estate company 
incorporated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-2195 
REBUTTAL TO STATEMENT OF 
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 
FACTS SUBMITTED BY 
PLAINTIFF 
COME NOW, Defendants Daren Long and All-In, Inc., by and through their counsel 
of record, and hereby submit that their motion for summary judgment should be granted by 
the Court and note the following with respect to the statement of additional material facts 
I - Rebuttal tu Stqtement of Additional Material Facts Submitted 37'2 
move to as 
were not submitted by an affidavit; 
2. In the alternative, Defendants note the following regarding the deposition 
~=~t1·m~n" ~ui...1n;Hed· LI..,;) UV lJ ;:, U llll • 
a. The testimony of Karie Jonak: 
The pages submitted by Plaintiff show that Jonak was confused about what zoning 
means. 
Q: What is proper zoning? 
A. It's commercial property zoning as far as I - - I mean, I couldn't tell you what that 
means. I couldn't give you a definition right now .... 
Jonak Deposition at 21. When she was asked on point, whether Daren Long represented that 
the property was "zoned commercial" Jonak replied that she "did not recall that". What her 
testimony indicates is that at most, it can be inferred that Long represented that the property 
should be suitable for Plaintiffs use, assuming that Plaintiff confirmed parking with the 
City. See id. at 20 (discussing parking and the need for more spaces). 
Jonak decided not to move into the Rollandet property, instead she moved into a 
property that "can be used as a house, and it can be used as a commercial space''. Id. at 22. 
She viewed this property as more appropriate for her uses, in large part, because it afforded 
more parking spaces that the Rollandet location. Id. at 23. 
Plaintiff has not shown how this testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to its causes of action. 
2 - Rebuttal to Statement of Additional Material Facts Submitted by Plaintiff 3 8 
as a a to 
to Heaith employees the space where "they" were discussing how "it would be a great 
location, that even through the parking was small and it was kind of designed as a condo, 
it was still commercially rated, and it would be great." Elliott Deposition at 21. She 
continued on to state: "they liked the way it was set up as an office building, the way it was 
being used." Id. at 21-22. Elliott recalled Long, Troy Carpenter, Dave Carpenter, herself 
and Tina being at the walk-through but couldn't recall who made these statements. Id. at 
24. She only remembered a "vague discussion". Id. at 23. 
Plaintiff provides no evidence of what Elliott thought the speaker meant by 
"commercially rated", or that it is relevant. There is no evidence in this testimony that Long 
made any representations at the walk-through. Indeed, given the gist of the reported 
conversation, it appears that it is reasonable to infer that the "they" that made statements 
were actually one or both of the Carpenters, as they were explaining the space to their 
employees. Again, Plaintiff has failed to show how this testimony creates a genuine issue 
of material fact with respect to its causes of action against the Defendants. 
c. The testimony of Rod Furniss 
With respect to the testimony of Rod Furniss, Defendants move to strike the statement 
that "Mr. Long represented [Furniss] as his real tor for the residential unit #3" since Plaintiff 
has not shown that it is relevant. As noted previously in Defendants' Motion to Strike, 
Plaintiff has not shown how the listing for a separate unit is probative or relevant as it was 
3 - Rebuttal to Statement of Additional Material Facts Submitted by Plaintiff 
nearly a after an Plaintiff of the which 
to at <iJ 13 21, 1 
testimony here does not establish any other time-line for the sale of the unit. 
Furniss did state that Long had told him about "the story" of "the transaction between 
Plaintiff and the Cannons after Plaintiff, but did not remember "if [Long] told me that he 
knew that Path to Health knew about the initial Conditional Use Permit or ifhe told me Scott 
[Cannon] knew about it." Furniss depo. at 23. If Long did make a statement that he knew 
about the Conditional Use Permit, he would have stated either that "he felt he had disclosed 
it or that he had told them what he knew". Plaintiff wants a jury to resolve the conflict in 
Furniss' testimony, but does not explain how this statement that Long may have made after 
the fact, creates a material issue of fact in respect of its causes of action. 
Plaintiff essentially claims that because Furniss knew about the Conditional Use 
Pennit, that everyone he spoke to at all about the unit - even in passing - would have heard 
about the Conditional Use Permit, remembered that fact, and most importantly would fully 
understand the legal implications associated with it. As implausible as this is, Plaintiff wants 
the Court to additionally believe that it is reasonable for a juror to infer, that Defendants, 
knowing all this, made intentional misrepresentations or concealed this fact when they were 
showing Plaintiff other properties suitable for commercial use. See, e.g., Jonak depo. at 18. 
Furniss himselfrecognized that not these inferences are not reasonable. He stated that 
when he told Joseph Scott Cannon about the Conditional Use Permit that although he was 
"fairly confident"- and therefore not absolutely sure - that he spoke to Cannon about the 
4 - Rebuttal to Statement of Additional Material Facts Submitted by Plaintiff 
that he was "not saying that would understood that or that would 
a Conditional Permit at l lS 
by his testimony that Cannon calied him after he learned Plaintiff was unhappy to find out 
what the Conditional Use Permit was and how it worked. Id. at 24. 
With respect to Defendants, Furniss did not testif; that he told Long about the 
Conditional Use Permit, much less explained it. See generally, Furniss depo. excerpts 
submitted by Plaintiff. 
Conclusion: 
In short, Plaintiff wants the Court to determine that unreasonable inferences should 
be made and further permit it to continue its claims despite explicit contract wording and 
statutory provisions that state that Defendants are neither qualified, nor required to provide 
Plaintiffs with verification regarding zoning. Plaintiff has failed to articulate how the 
submitted deposition testimony create a genuine issue of fact on all of the elements of each 
of its causes of action and that therefore why Defendants' motion should not be granted. 
Plaintiff has not met its burden; summary judgment should be granted for Defendants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this 13th day of March, 2014. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
By: 
Attorneys for 
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Plaintiff on· 
Na than M. 0 lsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 'E' Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208) 523-4650 
Attorneys/or Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile@ (208) 524-3391 
Q \FILES\OPEN CASE FILES\26-558 Path to Health v. Long & ReMax\Rebutta! to Statement or Additional Material Facts wpd 
6 - Rebuttal to Statement of Additional Material Facts Submitted by Plaintiff 




980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-2913 
Telephone: (208) 529-0000 





, ' , ,, 
! /\'.~ \ l: 
'' 'V i 
'\f' 
Attorneys for Defendants Daren Long and Re/Max All-In Realtors 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEAGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife; DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho; 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REAL TORS, a real estate company 
incorporated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2012-2195 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
SUPPLEMENTED ST A TEMENT 
OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 
FACTS SUBMITTED BY 
PLAINTIFF 
COME NOW, Defendants Daren Long and All-In, Inc., by and through their counsel 
of record, and hereby move the Court to strike or disregard Plaintiff's supplemented 
1 Motion to Strike Supplemented Statement of Additional Material facts in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
statement additional material facts for the following reasons: 
move to 
Additional lvfaterialfacts Opposition to Defendants' Motion/or Summary Judgment, and 
attaching materials since it was not submitted within the seven (7) days alloted by the Court 
to Plaintiff for its supplemental briefing. See Minute Entry (February 28, 2014); 
2. Defendants move to strike the submitted deposition testimony pages attached 
to the briefing, as they were not submitted by an affidavit; 
3. In the alternative, should the Court consider the supplemented statement, 
Defendants note that Plaintiff takes significant liberties with the submitted record, and asks 
the Court to closely review Plaintiff's citations. In particular, Defendants note: 
i) With respect to Plaintiff's claim that Long "admit[ted] that he discussed 'zoning' 
with the Carpenters"; the record shows no such admission. Supplemented Statement at 2. 
4. Again, as with Plaintiff's previous briefing, there is little cogent discussion of 
how the cited material creates issue of material fact which prevents summary judgment on 
each of its causes of action, especially given the contractual language of the Buyer's 
representation agreement and statutory language. Plaintiff has not met its burden; summary 
judgment should be granted for Defendants. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants move that the Court strike and disregard Plaintiff's 
Supplemented Statement of Additional Material/acts in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
2 - Motion to Strike Supplemented Statement of Additional Material facts in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment 8 4 
Summary Judgment or for such additional and other relief as the Court deems 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this l day March, 2014. 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
By: 
e Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of March, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion to Strike Supplemented Statement of Additional Material facts 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on: 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 'E' Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208) 523-4650 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PA TH TO HELA TH, LLP, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEGAN 
CA1','NON, husband and wife, DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho, 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALOTORS, a real estate company 
incorporated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 




This matter is before the Court on Defendants, Daren Long's and RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALOTORS' motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the claims raised by the 
Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP. At the time of the hearing, the Court allowed the Parties additional 
time to supplement the record with testimony relevant to the pending issues. Plaintiff thereafter filed 
a "Supplemental Statement" which referred to deposition testimony as attached to the Supplemental 
Statement. As noted by Defendants' objection, such is not a supplement to the record since the 
deposition testimony is simply attached to an unsworn statement. Accordingly, the Court will not 
consider the Supplemental Statement. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On or about May 18, 2011, the Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP and principals Dave and 
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Carpenter ("Path") entered into a "Buyer Representation Agreement" ("Agreement") with 
Daren ("Long") and REMAX ALL-IN REAL TORS the 
Path previously requested that Long find potential commercial properties in 
which Path could operate its "holistic health" business. 
Over a period of a few weeks, Long showed Path several commercial properties. At some 
point in the process, Long showed Path a condominium unit located at 480 W. Sunnyside Road# 4, 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 (the "Property") which was owned by the sellers Joseph Cannon and his 
wife Meagan (the "Cannons"). The Canons had been operating a commercial business on the 
property. The Property was one of four units in a building located on the comer of Rollandet and 
Sunnyside. 
Path became interested in the Property and negotiated the purchase of the Property through 
Long. Path alleges that throughout the entire process of investigating and purchasing the Property 
that Long repeatedly assured Path that the Property was commercial and could be used for Path's 
business. 
Sometime between the end of May and the beginning of June of 2011, the parties closed on 
the Property for a purchase price of$120,000. Path paid a down payment of $10,000 and financed 
the remaining $110,000. The closing occurred at the offices of First American Title Company. 
A few weeks after Path moved into the Property, Path approached the City of Idaho Falls 
about obtaining a permit to place a sign on the Property. At that time, the City representative 
informed Path that the Property was zoned for residential use and that Path was illegally operating a 
commercial business on the Property. Furthermore, the City informed Path that if it chose to 
continue operating a business on the Property, it would have to obtain a conditional use permit To 
obtain a conditional use permit, Path would have to acquire approval from both the Planning and 
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Commission and the City Council. 
then petitioned the to obtain a conditional use At 
expressed concerns about granting conditional use permits; however, the council 
recommended that Path's petition for a conditional use permit be granted. Based on the PZ's 
recommendation, the City council granted the conditional use permit. 
Even though the council granted the conditional use permit, Path was concerned about how 
this would affect the value of the property and its future use. After obtaining estimates, Path learned 
that it would cost about $50,000 to convert the Property to residential. 
At this point, Path sought to undo the transaction. In April 2012, Path filed a complaint 
against the Cannons for damages and petitioned the Court to reform or to rescind the contact. 
In September of 2012, Path and the Cannons mediated the issue wherein Path agreed to return 
title of the Property to the Cannons. Path alleges, as part of the deal, that the Cannons agreed to 
assign to Path any claims that they had against the Defendants. 
On October 25, 2012, the Court ordered the Dismissal of Claims against the Cannons with 
prejudice based upon the stipulation of the parties. Path then amended its complaint by dropping its 
claims against the Cannons, adding Long and Re/Max All-In Realtors as Defendants, and asserting 
additional claims against the Defendants. The remaining claims in this matter are designated in the 
Amended Complaint as Counts V, breach of contract, Count VI, negligence per se, Count VII, 
violation of the Consumer Protection Act, Count VIII, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
and Count IX, misrepresentation. 
On January 31, 2014, the Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Court now renders 
its decision and order as to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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court should grant summary judgment if the court determines "pleadings, 
on the show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." 
Friel v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994); I.R.C.P 56(c). When 
assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court is to liberally construe all controverted facts in 
favor of the nonmoving party. "Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the party resisting the motion"; however, "once the moving party establishes the absence of 
a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact on the elements challenged by the moving party." Navarrete v. City of 
Caldwell, 130 Idaho 849,851,949 P.2d 597,599 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest up the mere allegations or denials of 
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for trial." Friel, 126 Idaho at 485, 
887 P.2d at 30 (quoting Idaho R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must anchor in something more 
than speculation, and a mere "scintilla" of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. 
Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 868 P.2d 473 (1994) (plaintiff who produces mere 
scintilla of evidence, or otherwise raises only slight doubt as to facts, will not withstand summary 
judgment); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). If the nonmoving party does not 
come forward as provided in the rule, then the court should enter summary judgment against the 
nonmoving party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267,270, 899 P.2d 977, 
980 (1995). 
Rule 56( e) "requires a party to respond to a motion for summary judgment with something 
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more than relying on the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Affidavits or other proof must 
to court to set forth the specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
at " Furthermore "the purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of 
trial where facts are not in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of 
law which is certain ... this, if "a party resists summary judgment, it is his responsibility to place in 
the record before the trial court the existence of controverted material facts which require resolution 
by trial." Berg v Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,444, 690 P.2d 896, 899 (Idaho 1984). 
In cases such as the instant action, where the standard of proof required of the plaintiff at trial 
is clear and convincing evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court has been urged to adopt a standard 
"which would require the trial courts to take that quality and quantity of evidence into account when 
ruling on motions for summary judgment." G & M }arms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 
P.2d 851,854 (1991). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Breach of Contract. 
Sometime in the early part of May of 2011, Path instructed Long to find potential commercial 
properties in which Path could operate its "holistic health" business. Path alleges that Long breached 
the written Agreement of May 18, 2011 by failing to discover and disclose the Property's zoning 
before the completion of the sale. Path also alleges that Long breached the specific broker duties 
outlined in LC. § 54-2087. 
Under LC. § 54-2087, a broker owes a number of duties to a buyer/client in the course of 
locating property for purchase. These duties include: 
(1) To perform the terms of the written agreement with the client; 
(2) To exercise reasonable skill and care; 
(3) To be available to the client to receive and timely present all written offers and 
counteroffers; 
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To promote the best interests of the client in good faith, honesty and fair dealing 
including, but not limited to: 
(a) Disclosing to the client all adverse material actually 
or which reasonably should have been known by the licensee; 
(b) Seeking a buyer to purchase the seller's property at a price, and 
under terms and conditions acceptable to the seller and assisting in 
the negotiation therefor; or 
( c) Seeking a property for purchase at a price and under terms and 
conditions acceptable to the buyer and assisting in the negotiation 
therefor; 
(d) For the benefit of a client/buyer: when appropriate, advising the 
client to obtain professional inspections of the property or to seek 
appropriate tax, legal and other professional advice or counsel; 
(e) For the benefit of a client/seller: upon written request by a 
client/seller, requesting reasonable proof of a prospective buyer's 
financial ability to purchase the real property which is the subject 
matter of the transaction. This duty may be satisfied by any 
appropriate method suitable to the transaction or, when deemed 
necessary by the real estate licensee, by advising the client to consult 
with an accountant, lawyer, or other professional as dictated by the 
transaction. 
Idaho Code§ 54-2087. 
Accordingly, the broker owes a duty to the client to perform the terms of the written 
agreement along with the statutory duties. However, I.C. § 54-2087 not only outlines specific duties, 
it also limits the broker's responsibilities. LC § 54-2087(7) states: 
Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, a brokerage and its licensees owe no duty to a 
client to conduct an independent inspection of the property and owe no duty to 
independently verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement or representation 
made regarding a property. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, a brokerage and its 
licensees owe no duty to conduct an independent investigation of either party's 
financial ability to complete a real estate transaction. 
I.C. § 54-2087. 
Long asserts that the only contract that the parties entered into was the "Buyer Representation 
Agreement". Path's claim for breach of contract is based upon that written Agreement. However, 
the Agreement provides the following: 
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Broker cannot warrant the condition of the property to be acquired, or guarantee that 
all material facts are disclosed by the seller. Broker will not investigate the condition 
property including without limitation the status of permits, zoning, location 
lines ... and buyer must satisfy themselves concerning these issues by 
obtaining the appropriate expert advice. 
"Buyers Representation Agreement", ,r 4, Item H, Ex. 3, Affidavit of Donald Carey. (emphasis 
added). 
Neither the statute nor the Agreement imposed a duty on Long to discover and disclose the 
zoning of the subject property. In its breach of contract action, Path seeks to recover for a breach of 
duty that did not exist. Where the Parties' contract provided that Long owed no duty to discover the 
zoning on the property, the failure to determine the applicable zoning is not actionable. Accordingly, 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 
B. Negligence 
Count VI of the amended complaint alleges negligence per se. The allegation specifically 
refers to LC. § 54-2041, which relates to trust accounts and entrusted property. There are no facts 
which support an alleged violation of that statute. Liberally construed, Count VI also seeks to 
recover for alleged violations of LC. § 54-2087. 
First, as noted above, it is the Court's opinion that§ 54-2087 did not, under the facts of this 
case, create a duty on the part of Long to determine the zoning on the property. Second, any claim 
for negligence or negligence per se is subject to the economic loss rule. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held "[u]nless an exception applies, the economic loss rule 
prohibits recovery of purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to 
prevent economic loss to another." Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P .3d 
996, I 000 (2005); see also Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 
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1203 ( 1995). Path's alleged damages are economic. Therefore, to recover, Path must establish that 
an to economic loss applies to its 
Idaho Supreme Court Aardema v. Dairy lrtc., I Idaho 785,792,215 P.3d 
505, 512 (2009), outlined two exceptions to the economic loss rule: 
There are two exceptions to the general rule which prevents a party from recovering purely 
economic loss in a tort claim; those two exceptions are, (1) where a special relationship 
exists between the parties, or (2) where unique circumstances require a reallocation of the 
risk. 
Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785,792,215 P.3d 505,512 (2009). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, with respect to a "special relationship" statt~) 
A special relationship exists where the relationship between the parties is such that it 
would be equitable to impose such a duty. The special relationship exception to the 
economic loss rule is an extremely narrow exception which applies in only limited 
circumstances. This Court has found a special relationship to exist in only two 
situations, (I) where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services 
[;] and (2) where an entity holds itself out to the public as having expertise regarding 
a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its 
performance of that function. 
Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 792, 215 P.3d 505, 512 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
The burden is on Path to articulate how and why a special relationship existed between itself 
and Long. To establish this special relationship, Path must show that Long is either a professional as 
outlined in LC.§ 30-1303(1) or that Long held himself out as a zoning expert. 1 
1 The term "professional service" shall mean any type of service to the public that can be rendered 
by a member of any profession within the purview of his profession. For the purpose of this chapter, 
the professions shall be held to include the practices of architecture, chiropractic, dentistry, 
engineering, landscape architecture, law, medicine, nursing, occupational therapy, optometry, 
physical therapy, podiatry, professional geology, psychology, certified or licensed public 
accountancy, social work, surveying, and veterinary medicine, and no others. I.C. § 30-1303(1.) 
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Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a real tor is not a "professional" under Idaho law, in 
to for and the lack 
Realty , 140 Idaho 349, 93 680, 683 (2004): 
Currently Idaho law only requires that a real estate agent have a high school 
equivalent degree, LC. § 54-2012(1)(c), and pass a ninety-hour classroom or 
correspondence course, LC. § 54-2022(a). Including real estate agents in the list of 
professional services cited above would be inconsistent with the underlying training 
and educational foundation of every other occupation specifically designated as 
professional by the legislature. Accordingly, we find that including real estate agents 
as rendering professional services would be inconsistent with legislative intent in 
establishing a definition of professional services. Though we do not hold today that 
professional services are confined to those occupations specified in LC. §§ 30-
1303(1) and 53-615(8)(a), we do hold that in order for a service to be professional, it 
must be comparable to those occupations listed in terms of specialized higher 
education. [emphasis added] 
Accordingly, because realtors are not professionals and cannot be a party to "special 
relationship", Path must establish that Long held himself out as a zoning expert to avoid the 
economic loss rule. 
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that Long held himself out as a zoning 
expert or that he was aware of the area's zoning. In fact, both Path and Long stated numerous times 
that the Property looked like a commercial space to them. 
Additionally, the conclusion that a broker is not an expert in zoning is bolstered by§ 54-2087 
which specifies the duties of the real tor to the client, but also clarifies that a realtor does not have a 
duty to determine the status or condition of property. Section 54-2087 also defers to any written 
agreement, which as previously noted, the written agreement specifically provides that the realtor 
does not have a duty to detem1ine zoning. As such, there is no basis to conclude that Long was an 
expert in determining zoning of the property. 
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Long is entitled to summary judgment as to Path's negligence claims because (1) Long did 
not breach any applicable and Path's are precluded 
rule. 
C. Consumer Protection Act 
Path claims that Long violated the Consumer Protection Act by participating in unfair 
methods and practices. See LC. §§ 48-601 et al. Section 48-603 prohibits certain types of unfair 
methods and practices. However, § 48-605(1) states: 
Nothing in this act shall apply to: 
Actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the state public utility 
commission or other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this 
state or the United States. 
Therefore, if the alleged specific conduct is regulated by statue, it falls outside of the 
Consumer Protection Act. There can be no question that realtors are regulated by the Real Estate 
Commission: 
The Real Estate Commission had the power to revoke appellant's license for 
violation of its regulations under LC. s 54-2040. Here it chose the more moderate 
course of suspension, and modified its original ten-month suspension to five months 
upon rehearing. We find no abuse of discretion which would require reversal under 
LC. s 67-5215. The judgment is affirmed with costs to respondent. 
Staffofldaho Real Estate Comm'n v. Parkinson, 100 Idaho 96, 99,593 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1979). 
The Real Estate Commission's rules and regulations, passed pursuant to the 
enabling statute, I.C. s 54-2047, spell out the means whereby the broker must 
exercise his responsibility to the public. 
Dep't of Employment v. Bake Young Real~y, 98 Idaho 182, 184, 560 P.2d 504, 506 (1977). 
In applying § 48-605( 1) and its plain language, the subject transaction ( a brokered sale ofreal 
property) is one permitted by law (The Idaho Real Estate License Law) which law is administered by 
a regulatory body, the Idaho Real Estate Commission: "There is hereby created ... the ldaho real 
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estate commission, for the purpose of administering this chapter." § 54-2005. It is perhaps 
the exclusion contained § 48-605( 1) is logical. claims, 
asserts various violations of the Idaho Real Estate License To also then apply the 
Consumer Protection Act to the same set of facts is redundant and unnecessary. 
Accordingly, the Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the facts of this case. 
D. Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Path alleges that Long owed fiduciary duties to Path beyond those envisioned in a regulated 
real estate transaction. The parties are free to enter into a written agreement which creates an agency 
relationship and with that the corresponding fiduciary duties. However, unless reduced to writing, 
the duties and obligation owed to a client in a real estate transaction are not fiduciary in nature: 
While this act is intended to abrogate the common law of agency as it applies to 
regulated real estate transactions, nothing in this act shall prohibit a brokerage from 
entering into a written agreement with a buyer or seller which creates an agency 
relationship in which the duties and obligations are greater than those provided in this 
act. However. unless greater duties are specifically agreed to in writing between the 
brokerage and a represented client, the duties and obligations owed to a represented 
client in a regulated real estate transaction are not fiduciary in nature and are not 
subject to equitable remedies for breach of fiduciary duty. 
LC. ~ 54-2094 (emphases added). 
There are no genuine issues of fact as to whether the parties had entered into an additional 
agreement that imposed duties beyond the Act and therefore, Path's claim of breach of fiduciary 
duties is unsupported by the facts. 
Secondly, Path alleges that Long breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
"The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' 
contract. No covenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and 
executed by the parties." Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 
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1216 (2000). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a separate cause of action, 
is incidental to a breach contract. covenant is implied the contract. 
mentioned and analyzed above, Path claims are based on the fact that Long did not 
discover and disclose the Property's zoning prior to the completion of the sale. However, the 
implied covenant does not create additional duties outside the contract. Instead, it only "requires the 
parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement, and violations of the 
covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the 
contract." Id. The purpose of the agreement between the Parties was to search out real estate and 
help with the purchasing process. Long performed his duties of searching out properties and 
showing them to Path. According to the Agreement it was Path's duty to determine the Property's 
zoning. Therefore, the evidence does not support a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
E. Misrepresentation 
While Count IX of the Amended Complaint alleges misrepresentation, Path contends that 
Count IX also raises a claim in fraud. The Court will first consider a claim for misrepresentation. 
I. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Path alleges that Long negligently misrepresented the Property's zoning. However, Idaho law 
does not recognize negligent misrepresentation except in cases involving accountants. 
In Dujfin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 110,895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho except in cases 
involving accountants. The Supreme Court stated, "[t]o further clarify the matter, we expressly hold 
that, except in the narrow confines of a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of 
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negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho. Du/Jin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass 126 Idaho 
101 895 1203 (1995). 
Even negligent misrepresentation was recognized in Idaho, then it would be a negligence 
tort claim and subject to the economic loss rule. Id The record indicates that if Path actually 
suffered loss, then the loss was purely economic and barred by the economic loss rule. 
Therefore, because Idaho law does not recognize negligent misrepresentation under these 
facts, to the extent Path claims negligent misrepresentation, the claim must fail. 
2. Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation 
Long argues that Path failed to correctly plead an action in fraud. The party alleging fraud 
must support the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud by pleading with 
particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud. G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 
514. 518,808 P.2d 851,855 (1991); I.R.C.P. 9(b). It is the Court's opinion that alleged facts are 
sufficiently pleaded to assert a claim of fraud. 
To establish actionable fraud the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence the 
clements of fraud. First, "(l) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity; ( 5) the speaker's intent to induce reliance; ( 6) the hearer's ignorance of the 
falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent 
and proximate injury." Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595,600, 150 P.3d 288,293 
(2006). 
To avoid summary judgment on the claim, the evidence must create a genuine issue of fact as 
to the various clements. As to the allegation of fraud, the amended complaint asserts that 
"Carpenters were repeatedly assured by Long that the property was zoned for commercial use". 
Amended Complaint, , 10. The evidence however does not necessarily support this allegation. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 13 
There were clearly discussions about finding and purchasing commercial property. In case, any 
-~"'UUU that the subject property was commercial were accurate inasmuch as the property had 
been used a commercial purpose. Path asserts that at the time of closing, Long 
assured them that they would not have any problems with zoning or the commercial use of the 
property. To the extent Long made a representation about a future event, such cannot typically be the 
basis of fraud. 
"An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future 
events. The law requires the plaintiff to form his or her own conclusions regarding 
the occurrence of future events." Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 
200,207, 61 P.3d 557, 564 (2002) (internal citations omitted). Opinions and 
predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim because they do not speak to 
matters of fact. ... Likewise, "where a speaker gives an opinion when he is aware 
of facts incompatible with such opinion, the opinion may amount to a false 
statement of fact if made with the intention of deceiving or misleading." Jordan v. 
Hunter, 124 Idaho 899, 907, 865 P.2d 990, 998 (Ct.App. 1993) (citing Fox. v, 
Cosgr[ff, 66 Idaho 371, 380-81, 159 P.2d 224, 227-28 (1945)). Postulating what 
Myron might do if he did not get 10% interest in a contract negotiation is too 
speculative to constitute an existing fact and is too speculative to constitute a false 
prediction. 
Country Cove Dev,, Inc. v. )vfay, 143 Idaho 595,601, 150 P.3d 288,294 (2006). 
Ultimately, the Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact as to alleged 
representations by Long, whether the representations were false, and whether they were material. 
The problem with Path's fraud claim is whether Path was entitled to rely on any representations 
made by Long regarding zoning. In considering this issue, the Court must also consider the 
language of the Buyer Representation Agreement and the apportionment of duties. 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides that Long would not investigate the zoning of the 
property. That Paragraph goes on to place the duty on Path to determine zoning: " ... BUYER 
must satisfy themself concerning these issues [zoning] by obtaining the appropriate expert 
advice." Paragraph 17 of the Agreement contains a merger provision: "The terms hereof 
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constitute the entire agreement and supersede all prior agreements, negotiations, and discussions 
" 
Where Path contractually assumed the duty to investigate on its ow11 the zoning status of 
the property, reliance upon a statement from Long cannot be reasonable or justifiable. While 
Path has raised issues regarding the execution of the Agreement and backdating, there has been 
no argument to the effect that the Agreement should not be enforced. Indeed, as evident from 
Path's Amended Complaint and the breach of contract claim, it is Path's position that the 
Agreement is valid and enforceable. Thus, in applying the plain language of the Agreement, 
Long did not have the responsibility to determine zoning; instead, that responsibility was placed 
on Path. Therefore, the Court finds that reasonable minds could not differ that there could be no 
justifiable reliance on any statement from Long regarding zoning. The fraud claim is precluded 
because that particular element cannot be met. 
Path also alleges that Long's nondisclosure of the Property's zoning amounts to fraud by 
nondisclosure. 
A duty to disclose may arise under certain circumstances. 
A duty to disclose may arise when (a) a party to a business transaction is in a 
fiduciary relationship [ or other similar relationship of trust and confidence] with the 
other party; or (b) disclosure would be necessary to prevent a partial or ambiguous 
statement of fact from becoming misleading; or ( c) subsequent information has been 
acquired which a party knows will make a previous representation untrue or 
misleading; or ( d) a party knows a false representation is about to be relied upon; or 
( e) a party knows the opposing party is about to enter into the transaction under a 
mistake of fact and because of the relationship between them or the customs of trade 
or other objective circumstances would reasonably expect a disclosure of the facts. 
Walls v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,620, 962 P.2d 387,391 (1998) quoting Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. 
Ctr., Inc. v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501, 508, 861 P.2d 71, 78 (Ct.App.1992) (citing Restatement 
(Second) Of Torts§ 551(2)). 
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To establish a claim of fraud by nondisclosure, a plaintiff is required to prove, " .. by clear 
convincing evidence, that there was [a] nondisclosure, [the plaintiff] relied upon [the] 
that reliance was material to the transaction, and that [the plaintiff] was damaged 
as a proximate result of the nondisclosure." Watts v. Krebs, 13 l Idaho 616,619, 962 P.2d 387,390 
( 1998). As with a claim of actual fraud, reliance on the alleged nondisclosure must be reasonable or 
justifiable. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 9 I Idaho 55, 59,415 P.2d 698, 702 (1966), the Court adopted 
the Restatement relating to a duty to disclose: 
In the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, considered by 
The American Law Institute at its annual meeting in May, 1966, s 551(1) is 
presented as follows: 
'(1) One who fails to disclose to another a thing which he knows may justifiably 
induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to 
the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the 
matter which he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the 
other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.' [ emphasis 
added] 
For the same reason there can be no justifiable reliance in the claim for actual fraud, there can 
be no justifiable reliance on the claim for fraud by nondisclosure. Where Path contractually assumed 
the duty to determine all issues relating to zoning, reliance on the silence of Long is not reasonable as 
a matter of law. 2 
F. Assignment 
Path alleges in the amended complaint that it took an assignment from the Cannons and is 
entitled to assert claims the Cannons have against Long. First, allegations or even testimony are 
insufficient to establish an assignment. Under the best evidence rule, the content of a writing must 
be proved by the writing ( subject to certain exceptions). Rule 1002, IRE. The record does not reflect 
2 It is worth noting that Path signed the Real Estate Purchase Agreement with the Cannons which provided that "all 
parties are aware of the zoning on the property". Such is additional evidence that goes to whether Path could 
reasonably rely upon any statement or nondisclosure by Long. 
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any writing upon which alleged assignment is based. 
cannot speculate as to the theory or nature claim the maybe 
entitled to assert against Long. Indeed, from the record, it is difficult to envision some viable claim 
the Cannons would have against Long. 
ln any event, no assignment has been established and no viable claim of the Canon's has been 
identified. As such Long is entitled to summary judgment as to any "assigned claim". 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
( J~~ ~- Tingey 
'-Distnct Judge 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PA l H TO HELA TH, LLP, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JOSEPH SCOTT CANNON and MEGAN 
CANNON, husband and wife, DAREN 
LONG, an individual residing in Idaho, 
ALL-IN INC., dba RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALOTORS, a real estate company 
incorporated in Idaho, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CR-201 195 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants, Daren Long's and RE/MAX ALL-IN 
REALOTORS' motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the claims raised by the 
Plaintiff, Path to Health, LLP. At the time of the hearing, the Court allowed the Parties additional 
time to supplement the record with testimony relevant to the pending issues. Plaintiff thereafter filed 
a "Supplemental Statement" which referred to deposition testimony as attached to the Supplemental 
Statement. As noted by Defendants' objection, such is not a supplement to the record since the 
deposition testimony is simply attached to an unsworn statement. Accordingly, the Court will not 
consider the Supplemental Statement. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
or about 18, 2011, the Plaintiff~ Path to Health, LLP and its principals Dave and 
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("Path") entered into a Representation Agreement" ("Agreement") with 
which Path could operate its "holistic health" business. 
Over a period of a few weeks, Long showed Path several commercial properties. At some 
point in the process, Long showed Path a condominium unit located at 480 W. Sunnyside Road# 4, 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 (the "Property") which was owned by the sellers Joseph Cannon and his 
wife Meagan (the "Cannons"). The Canons had been operating a commercial business on the 
property. The Property was one of four units in a building located on the corner of Rollandet and 
Sunnyside. 
Path became interested in the Property and negotiated the purchase of the Property through 
Long. Path alleges that throughout the entire process of investigating and purchasing the Prope1iy 
that Long repeatedly assured Path that the Property was commercial and could be used for Path's 
business. 
Sometime between the end of May and the beginning of June of 2011, the paiiies closed on 
the Prope1iy for a purchase price of$120,000. Path paid a down payment of $10,000 and financed 
the remaining $110,000. The closing occurred at the offices of First American Title Company. 
A few weeks after Path moved into the Property, Path approached the City of Idaho Falls 
about obtaining a permit to place a sign on the Property. At that time, the City representative 
informed Path that the Property was zoned for residential use and that Path was illegally operating a 
commercial business on the Property. Furthermore, the City informed Path that if it chose to 
continue operating a business on the Property, it would have to obtain a conditional use permit. To 
obtain a conditional use permit, Path would have to acquire approval from both the Planning and 
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and the City Council. 
to obtain 
expressed concerns about granting conditional use 
recommended that Path's petition for a conditional use permit be granted. Based on the PZ's 
recommendation, the City council granted the conditional use permit. 
Even though the council granted the conditional use permit, Path was concerned about how 
this would affect the value of the property and its future use. After obtaining estimates, Path learned 
that it would cost about $50,000 to convert the Property to residential. 
At this point, Path sought to undo the transaction. In April 2012, Path filed a complaint 
against the Cannons for damages and petitioned the Court to reform or to rescind the contact. 
In September of 2012, Path and the Carrnons mediated the issue wherein Path agreed to return 
title of the Property to the Cannons. Path alleges, as part of the deal, that the Cannons agreed to 
assign to Path any claims that they had against the Defendants. 
On October 25, 2012, the Court ordered the Dismissal of Claims against the Cannons with 
prejudice based upon the stipulation of the parties. Path then amended its complaint by dropping its 
claims against the Cannons, adding Long and Re/Max All-In Realtors as Defendants, and asserting 
additional claims against the Defendants. The remaining claims in this matter are designated in the 
Amended Complaint as Counts V, breach of contract, Count VI, negligence per se, Count VII, 
violation of the Consumer Protection Act, Count VIII, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
and Count IX, misrepresentation. 
On January 31, 2014, the Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Court now renders 
its decision and order as to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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court "pleadings, 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." 
v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485,887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994); I.R.C.P 56(c). When 
assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court is to liberally construe all controverted facts in 
favor of the nonmoving party. "Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the party resisting the motion"; however, "once the moving party establishes the absence of 
a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact on the elements challenged by the moving party." Navarrete v. City ol 
Caldwell, 130 Idaho 849, 851, 949 P.2d 597, 599 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The party opposing summary judgment "may not rest up the mere allegations or denials of 
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for trial." Friel, 126 Idaho at 485, 
887 P.2d at 30 (quoting Idaho R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must anchor in something more 
than speculation, and a mere "scintilla" of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. 
Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 868 P.2d 4 73 (1994) (plaintiff who produces mere 
scintilla of evidence, or otherwise raises only slight doubt as to facts, will not withstand summary 
judgment); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). If the nonmoving party does not 
come forward as provided in the rule, then the court should enter summary judgment against the 
nonmoving party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 
980 ( 1995). 
Rule 56(e) "requires a party to respond to a motion for summary judgment with something 
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relying on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Affidavits or other proof must 
court to set 1S a 
at Furt.hermore purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of 
trial where facts are not in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of 
law which is certain ... this, if "a party resists summary judgment, it is his responsibility to place in 
the record before the trial court the existence of controverted material facts which require resolution 
by trial." Berg v Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,444,690 P.2d 896, 899 (Idaho 1984). 
In cases such as the instant action, where the standard of proof required of the plaintiff at trial 
is clear and convincing evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court has been urged to adopt a standard 
"which would require the trial courts to take that quality and quantity of evidence into account when 
ruling on motions for summary judgment." G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 51 7, 808 
P.2d 851, 854 (1991). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Breach of Contract. 
Sometime in the early part of May of 2011, Path instructed Long to find potential commercial 
properties in which Path could operate its "holistic health" business. Path alleges that Long breached 
the written Agreement of May 18, 2011 by failing to discover and disclose the Property's zoning 
before the completion of the sale. Path also alleges that Long breached the specific broker duties 
outlined in I.C. § 54-2087. 
Under LC. § 54-2087, a broker owes a number of duties to a buyer/client in the course of 
locating property for purchase. These duties include: 
(1) To perform the terms of the written agreement with the client; 
(2) To exercise reasonable skill and care; 
To be available to the client to receive and timely present all written offers and 
counteroffers; 
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To promote the best interests of the client in good faith, honesty and 
not limited to: 
to the client 
or which reasonably should 
Seeking a buyer to purchase the seller's property at a 
under terms and conditions acceptable to the seller and assisting in 
the negotiation therefor; or 
( c) Seeking a property for purchase at a price and under terms and 
conditions acceptable to the buyer and assisting in the negotiation 
therefor; 
(d) For the benefit of a client/buyer: when appropriate, advising the 
client to obtain professional inspections of the property or to seek 
appropriate tax, legal and other professional advice or counsel; 
(e) For the benefit of a client/seller: upon written request by a 
client/seller, requesting reasonable proof of a prospective buyer's 
financial ability to purchase the real property which is the subject 
matter of the transaction. This duty may be satisfied by any 
appropriate method suitable to the transaction or, when deemed 
necessary by the real estate licensee, by advising the client to consult 
with an accountant, lawyer, or other professional as dictated by the 
transaction. 
Idaho Code§ 54-2087. 
Accordingly, the broker owes a duty to the client to perform the terms of the written 
agreement along with the statutory duties. However, I.C. § 54-2087 not only outlines specific duties, 
it also limits the broker's responsibilities. I.C § 54-2087(7) states: 
Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, a brokerage and its licensees owe no duty to a 
client to conduct an independent inspection of the property and owe no duty to 
independently verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement or representation 
made regarding a property. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, a brokerage and its 
licensees owe no duty to conduct an independent investigation of either party's 
financial ability to complete a real estate transaction. 
I.C. § 54-2087. 
Long asserts that the only contract that the parties entered into was the "Buyer Representation 
Agreement". Path's claim for breach of contract is based upon that written Agreement. However, 
the Agreement provides the following: 
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added). 
cannot warrant the condition of the ~~n,~=·~· to be acquired, or guarantee that 
facts are disclosed by the not investigate the 
without 
buyer must 
the appropriate expert advice. 
Representation Agreement", ,-r 4, Item H, Ex. 3, Affidavit of Donald Carey. ( emphasis 
Neither the statute nor the Agreement imposed a duty on Long to discover and disclose the 
zoning of the subject property. In its breach of contract action, Path seeks to recover for a breach of 
duty that did not exist. Where the Parties' contract provided that Long owed no duty to discover the 
zoning on the property, the failure to determine the applicable zoning is not actionable. Accordingly, 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 
B. Negligence 
Count VI of the amended complaint alleges negligence per se. The allegation specifically 
refers to LC. § 54-2041, which relates to trust accounts and entrusted property. There are no facts 
which support an alleged violation of that statute. Liberally construed, Count VI also seeks to 
recover for alleged violations of I.C. § 54-2087. 
First, as noted above, it is the Court's opinion that§ 54-2087 did not, under the facts of this 
case, create a duty on the part of Long to determine the zoning on the property. Second, any claim 
for negligence or negligence per se is subject to the economic loss rule. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held "[u]nless an exception applies, the economic loss rule 
prohibits recovery of purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to 
prevent economic loss to another." Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 
l 000 (2005); see also Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 1195, 
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Path's alleged damages are economic. Therefore, to recover, Path must establish that 
to applies to 
Supreme Court in Aardema v. Dairy , 147 215 P.3d 
505. 512 (2009), outlined two exceptions to the economic loss rule: 
There are two exceptions to the general rule which prevents a party from recovering purely 
economic loss in a tort claim; those two exceptions are, (1) where a special relationship 
exists between the parties, or (2) where unique circumstances require a reallocation of the 
risk. 
Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785,792,215 P.3d 505,512 (2009). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, with respect to a "special relationship" stated: 
A special relationship exists where the relationship between the parties is such that it 
would be equitable to impose such a duty. The special relationship exception to the 
economic loss rule is an extremely narrow exception which applies in only limited 
circumstances. This Court has found a special relationship to exist in only two 
situations, ( 1) where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services 
[;] and (2) where an entity holds itself out to the public as having expertise regarding 
a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces reliance on its 
performance of that function. 
Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 792,, 215 P.3d 505,512 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
The burden is on Path to articulate how and why a special relationship existed between itself 
and Long. To establish this special relationship, Path must show that Long is either a professional as 
outlined in LC. § 30-1303(1) or that Long held himself out as a zoning expert. 1 
1 The term "professional service" shall mean any type of service to the public that can be rendered 
by a member of any profession within the purview of his profession. For the purpose of this chapter, 
the professions shall be held to include the practices of architecture, chiropractic, dentistry, 
engineering, landscape architecture, law, medicine, nursing, occupational therapy, optometry, 
physical therapy, podiatry, professional geology, psychology, certified or licensed public 
social work, surveying, and veterinary medicine, and no others. I.C § 30-1303(1.) 
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Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a realtor is not a "professional" under Idaho law, in 
, 140 p 680,683 
Currently Idaho law only requires that a real estate agent have a high school 
equivalent degree, LC. § 54-2012( 1 )( c ), and pass a ninety-hour classroom or 
correspondence course, LC. § 54-2022(a). Including real estate agents in the list of 
professional services cited above would be inconsistent with the underlying training 
and educational foundation of every other occupation specifically designated as 
professional by the legislature. Accordingly, we find that including real estate agents 
as rendering professional services would be inconsistent with legislative intent in 
establishing a definition of professional services. Though we do not hold today that 
professional services are confined to those occupations specified in LC. §§ 30-
1303(1) and 53-615(8)(a), we do hold that in order for a service to be professional, it 
must be comparable to those occupations listed in terms of specialized higher 
education. [ emphasis added] 
V. 
Accordingly, because realtors are not professionals and cannot be a party to "special 
relationship", Path must establish that Long held himself out as a zoning expert to avoid the 
economic loss rule. 
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that Long held himself out as a zoning 
expert or that he was aware of the area's zoning. In fact, both Path and Long stated numerous times 
that the Property looked like a commercial space to them. 
Additionally, the conclusion that a broker is not an expert in zoning is bolstered by§ 54-2087 
which specifies the duties of the realtor to the client, but also clarifies that a realtor does not have a 
duty to determine the status or condition of property. Section 54-2087 also defers to any written 
agreement, which as previously noted, the written agreement specifically provides that the realtor 
does not have a duty to determine zoning. As such, there is no basis to conclude that Long was an 
expert in determining zoning of the property. 
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IS to summary judgment as to did 
Consumer Protection Act 
Path claims that Long violated the Consumer Protection Act by participating in unfair 
methods and practices. See I.C. §§ 48-601 et al. Section 48-603 prohibits certain types of unfair 
methods and practices. However, § 48-605(1) states: 
Nothing in this act shall apply to: 
Actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the state public utility 
commission or other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this 
state or the United States. 
Therefore, if the alleged specific conduct is regulated by statue, it falls outside of the 
Consumer Protection Act. There can be no question that realtors are regulated by the Real Estate 
Commission: 
The Real Estate Commission had the power to revoke appellant's license for 
violation of its regulations under LC. s 54-2040. Here it chose the more moderate 
course of suspension, and modified its original ten-month suspension to five months 
upon rehearing. We find no abuse of discretion which would require reversal under 
LC. s 67-5215. The judgment is affirmed with costs to respondent. 
Staflof Idaho Real Estate Comm'n v. Parkinson, l 00 Idaho 96, 99, 593 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1979). 
The Real Estate Commission's rules and regulations, passed pursuant to the 
enabling statute, LC. s 54-2047, spell out the means whereby the broker must 
exercise his responsibility to the public. 
Dep't o(Employment v. Bake Young Realty, 98 Idaho 182, 184, 560 P.2d 504, 506 (1977). 
In applying§ 48-605(1) and its plain language, the subject transaction (a brokered sale of real 
property) is one permitted by law (The Idaho Real Estate License Law) which law is administered by 
a regulatory body, the Idaho Real Estate Commission: "There is hereby created ... the Idaho real 
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estate for the purpose of administering this chapter." J.C. § 54-2005. It is perhaps 
§ ) 
asserts violations Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act to the same set of facts is redundant and unnecessary. 
Accordingly, the Consumer Protection Act does not apply to the facts of this case. 
D. Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Path alleges that Long owed fiduciary duties to Path beyond those envisioned in a regulated 
real estate transaction. The parties are free to enter into a written agreement which creates an agency 
relationship and with that the corresponding fiduciary duties. However, unless reduced to writing, 
the duties and obligation owed to a client in a real estate transaction are not fiduciary in nature: 
While this act is intended to abrogate the common law of agency as it applies to 
regulated real estate transactions, nothing in this act shall prohibit a brokerage from 
entering into a written agreement with a buyer or seller which creates an agency 
relationship in which the duties and obligations are greater than those provided in this 
act. However, unless greater duties are spec(fically agreed to in writing between the 
brokerage and a represented client, the duties and obligations owed to a represented 
client in a regulated real estate transaction are not fiduciary in nature and are not 
subject to equitable remedies for breach o.ffiduciary duty. 
I.C. § 54-2094 (emphases added). 
There are no genuine issues of fact as to whether the parties had entered into an additional 
agreement that imposed duties beyond the Act and therefore, Path's claim of breach of fiduciary 
duties is unsupported by the facts. 
Secondly, Path alleges that Long breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
"The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' 
contract. No covenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and 
the parties." Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 ldaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 
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6 implied covenant of good fair dealing is not a cause of action, 
to a covenant 111 
analyzed are on that not 
discover and disclose the Property's zoning prior to the completion of the sale. However, the 
implied covenant does not create additional duties outside the contract. Instead, it only "requires the 
parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement, and violations of the 
covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the 
contract." Id. The purpose of the agreement between the Parties was to search out real estate and 
help with the purchasing process. Long performed his duties of searching out properties and 
showing them to Path. According to the Agreement it was Path's duty to determine the Property's 
zoning. Therefore, the evidence does not support a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
E. Misrepresentation 
While Count IX of the Amended Complaint alleges misrepresentation, Path contends that 
Count [X also raises a claim in fraud. The Court will first consider a claim for misrepresentation. 
1. Negligent Misrepresentation 
Path alleges that Long negligently misrepresented the Property's zoning. However, Idaho law 
does not recognize negligent misrepresentation except in cases involving accountants. 
In Duffin v. Idaho Crop Imp. Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 110, 895 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1995), the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho except in cases 
involving accountants. The Supreme Court stated, "[t]o further clarify the matter, we expressly hold 
that, except in the narrow confines of a professional relationship involving an accountant, the tort of 
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misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho. Duffin v. Idaho Crop 1 Idaho 
1 (1 
then it 
tort claim and subject to the economic loss rule. Id. The record indicates that if Path actually 
suffered loss, then the loss was purely economic and barred by the economic loss rule. 
Therefore, because Idaho law does not recognize negligent misrepresentation under these 
facts, to the extent Path claims negligent misrepresentation, the claim must fail. 
2. Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation 
Long argues that Path failed to correctly plead an action in fraud. The party alleging fraud 
must support the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud by pleading with 
particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud. G & _M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 ldaho 
514. 518, 808 P.2d 851,855 (1991); I.R.C.P. 9(b). It is the Court's opinion that alleged facts are 
sufficiently pleaded to assert a claim of fraud. 
To establish actionable fraud the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence the 
elements of fraud. First, "(1) a statement of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; ( 4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent to induce reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the 
falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) the hearer's right to rely; and (9) consequent 
and proximate injury." Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 600, 150 P.3d 288, 293 
(2006). 
To avoid summary judgment on the claim, the evidence must create a genuine issue of fact as 
to the various elements. As to the allegation of fraud, the amended complaint asserts that 
"Carpenters were repeatedly assured by Long that the property was zoned for commercial use". 
Amended Complaint, i1 10. The evidence however does not necessarily support this allegation. 
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discussions about finding and purchasing commercial nrr\Y'\PYHl this case, any 
property was were accurate as 
a commercial asserts at time 
assured them that they would not have any problems with zoning or the commercial use of the 
property. To the extent Long made a representation about a future event, such cannot typically be the 
basis of fraud. 
"An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future 
events. The law requires the plaintiff to form his or her own conclusions regarding 
the occurrence of future events." Thomas v. Af ed. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 13 8 Idaho 
200, 207, 61 P.3d 557, 564 (2002) (internal citations omitted). Opinions and 
predictions cannot form the basis of a fraud claim because they do not speak to 
matters of fact. ... Likewise, "where a speaker gives an opinion when he is aware 
of facts incompatible with such opinion, the opinion may amount to a false 
statement of fact if made with the intention of deceiving or misleading." Jordan v. 
Hunter, 124 Idaho 899, 907, 865 P.2d 990, 998 (Ct.App.1993) (citing Fox. v. 
Cosgr[/J: 66 Idaho 371, 380-81, 159 P.2d 224, 227-28 (1945)). Postulating what 
Myron might do if he did not get 10% interest in a contract negotiation is too 
speculative to constitute an existing fact and is too speculative to constitute a false 
prediction. 
Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288,294 (2006). 
Ultimately, the Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact as to alleged 
representations by Long, whether the representations were false, and whether they were material. 
The problem with Path's fraud claim is whether Path was entitled to rely on any representations 
made by Long regarding zoning. In considering this issue, the Court must also consider the 
language of the Buyer Representation Agreement and the apportionment of duties. 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides that Long would not investigate the zoning of the 
property. That Paragraph goes on to place the duty on Path to determine zoning: " ... BUYER 
must satisfy themself concerning these issues [ zoning] by obtaining the appropriate expert 
" Paragraph 17 of the Agreement contains a merger provision: "The tenns hereof 
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entire agreement and supersede agreements, negotiations, 
assumed to on own zoning status 
property, reliance upon a statement from Long cannot be reasonable or justifiable. While 
Path has raised issues regarding the execution of the Agreement and backdating, there has been 
no argument to the effect that the Agreement should not be enforced. Indeed, as evident from 
Path's Amended Complaint and the breach of contract claim, it is Path's position that the 
Agreement is valid and enforceable. Thus, in applying the plain language of the Agreement, 
Long did not have the responsibility to determine zoning; instead, that responsibility was placed 
on Path. Therefore, the Court finds that reasonable minds could not differ that there could be no 
justifiable reliance on any statement from Long regarding zoning. The fraud claim is precluded 
because that particular element cannot be met. 
Path also alleges that Long's nondisclosure of the Property's zoning amounts to fraud by 
nondisclosure. 
A duty to disclose may arise under certain circumstances. 
A duty to disclose may arise when (a) a party to a business transaction is in a 
fiduciary relationship [ or other similar relationship of trust and confidence] with the 
other party; or (b) disclosure would be necessary to prevent a partial or ambiguous 
statement of fact from becoming misleading; or ( c) subsequent information has been 
acquired which a party knows will make a previous representation untrue or 
misleading; or ( d) a party knows a false representation is about to be relied upon; or 
( e) a party knows the opposing party is about to enter into the transaction under a 
mistake of fact and because of the relationship between them or the customs of trade 
or other objective circumstances would reasonably expect a disclosure of the facts. 
Walls v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,620, 962 P.2d 387,391 (1998) quoting Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med 
Inc. v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501, 508, 861 P.2d 71, 78 (Ct.App.1992) (citing Restatement 
Of To11s § 1 
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To establish a claim of fraud by nondisclosure, a plaintiff is required to prove, " ... by clear 
that there was [a] nondisclosure, 
that [the] reliance was material to the transaction, and that was 
as a proximate result of the nondisclosure." Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 619, 962 P.2d 387, 390 
(1998). As with a claim of actual fraud, reliance on the alleged nondisclosure must be reasonable or 
justifiable. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 59,415 P.2d 698, 702 (1966), the Court adopted 
the Restatement relating to a duty to disclose: 
In the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, considered by 
The American Law Institute at its annual meeting in May, 1966, s 551 (1) is 
presented as follows: 
'(1) One who fails to disclose to another a thing which he knows may justifiably 
induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to 
the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the 
matter which he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the 
other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.' [ emphasis 
added] 
For the same reason there can be no justifiable reliance in the claim for actual fraud, there can 
be no justifiable reliance on the claim for fraud by nondisclosure. Where Path contractually assumed 
the duty to determine all issues relating to zoning, reliance on the silence of Long is not reasonable as 
a matter of law. 2 
F. Assignment 
Path alleges in the amended complaint that it took an assignment from the Cannons and is 
entitled to assert claims the Cannons have against Long. First, allegations or even testimony are 
insufficient to establish an assignment. Under the best evidence rule, the content of a writing must 
be proved by the writing ( subject to certain exceptions). Rule 1002, IRE. The record does not reflect 
It is worth noting that Path signed the Real Estate Purchase Agreement with the Cannons which provided that "all 
parties are aware of the zoning on the property". Such is additional evidence that goes to whether Path could 
upon any statement or nondisclosure by Long. 
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upon which alleged assignment is 
not 
cannot speculate as to or nature Cannons may 
entitled to assert against Long. Indeed, from the record, it is difficult to envision some viable claim 
the Cannons would have against Long. 
In any event, no assignment has been established and no viable claim of the Canon's has been 
identified. As such Long is entitled to summary judgment as to any "assigned claim". 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this J day of March, 2014. 
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Nathan M. Olsen 
485 E Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Donald F. Carey 
P.O. Box 51388 
980 Pier View Dr., Suite B 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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